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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore the various factors that contribute to ROK’s 
decision making in procurement of foreign countries defense articles. South Korea is one 
of the largest weapon purchasers from the U.S. and needs a more self-reliant defense 
force that can maintain its security with its own authority under the current cease-fire 
situation. Thus, this study focused on identifying the main factors to consider in deciding 
whether to purchase a major defense weapon system from other countries. Through the 
interview of experts who participated in specific weapon programs, thirteen specific 
factors were evaluated including Interoperability, Offset valuation, Mission performance 
capability, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), Lifecycle, Timely Deployment, Depot 
Maintenance, National Security, U.S.-ROK Alliance, Northeast Asia Strategy, Defense 
Budget Levels, ROK Political Environments and Trends in Public Opinion in order to 
explain what the essential elements in the process of ROK’s decision making are. The 
focus of this thesis is to identify the critical factors to support foreign weapon programs.  
 Finally, this study revealed that mission performance capability, interoperability, 
integrated logistics support, and offset valuation were primary considerations in the 
process of ROK’s decision-making. This information will provide valuable lessons 
learned which can be applied to future ROK military defense procurement. 
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A CASE ANALYSIS EXPLAINING THE MAIN FACTORS THAT 
CONTRIBUTE TO ROK’S DECISION MAKING IN PROCUREMENT OF 
DEFENSE ARTICLES 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In early 2005, the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) launched 
the Strategic Policy Initiative, a cooperative effort aimed at updating the alliance to meet 
the security threats of the post-9/11 world, restructuring the U.S. presence on the Korean 
Peninsula, and adjusting command relationships within the alliance (Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 2007: 1).  
For over half a century, the primary purpose of the alliance has remained the 
deterrence of North Korea. Threat perceptions in both the United States and the Republic 
of Korea have changed since the late 1990s. The key issue confronting the alliance today 
is the strategic dissonance regarding North Korea, but other challenges face the alliance: 
the rise of China, threats to international order posed by terrorists, and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the need to restructure the alliance to meet 
changing international and domestic realities in both countries (INSS Special Report, 
2007: 1). The following statement more specifically defines this transformation: 
Overall, we judge alliance transformation the best option to address both the military 
and political dimensions of the alliance. Transforming the alliance, including the 
transfer of wartime operational control, will not only strengthen the alliance 
politically but also open new avenues for security cooperation. We believe that a 
transformed alliance will safeguard peace on the Korean Peninsula, support the 
process of Korean unification, and contribute to a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific 
region (INSS Special Report, 2007: 1). 
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South Korea continues to grow its economy and technology and in the changing 
security environment in the world, there are suggestions that South Korea needs a self-
defense military strength to cope with new threats in the future. Therefore, it is important 
to understand what factors determine what our country considers in deciding to purchase 
a major weapon system from foreign countries. 
Although this paper details some of the history that has led to this point, the 
purpose of this study is not merely to analyze the weapon procurement process. Rather, 
the goal is to explore the various factors that contribute to ROK’s decision making in 
procurement of defense articles. 
 
Background 
Historical and Geographical Situation of South Korea 
Throughout history, Korea has experienced invasions from powerful countries. 
Korea, both the South and North, was under the occupation of Japan for 36 years (1910-
1945). It has also been invaded by China, Mongolia, and numerous other times by Japan. 
This long history of invasions has caused South Korea to require its own defense 
capability in order to protect itself. The defense system desired by South Korea is not 
simply for the satisfaction of an immediate need, but also an inevitable necessity (Kim, 
2001). 
Geographically, Korea is surrounded by some of the most powerful countries in 
the world, such as Japan, Russia, and China. For instance, as described below, China is 
definitely one of the main countries to build up its military capability: 
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China’s defense expenditures are much higher than Chinese officials have 
published. It is estimated that China’s is the third largest military budget in the 
world, and clearly the largest in Asia. China appears to be expanding its missile 
forces, allowing them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the 
Pacific region, while also expanding its missile capabilities within this region. 
China also is improving its ability to project power, and developing advanced 
systems of military technology (Secretary Rumsfeld, June 2005). 
 
The U.S., the most powerful military country in the world, has also stationed its 
strong troops in South Korea and Japan. South Korea should increase its military strength 
in response to North Korea’s constant threat and confrontation, other reasons include the 
lack of certainty about where the North is heading with its nuclear weapons program and 
the recent dispute with Japan for Dokdo, an island between Korea and Japan, the control 
of which would help Korea prevent future national security problems. For these reasons, 
South Korea realized that it will not be able to live without the ability to defend itself in 
the future (Bak, 2005). 
 
Restructuring the U.S.-ROK Alliance in Korea 
 In the decade following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which 
testified to the emergence of a new global security environment, one defined by the 
threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the United States called for a fundamental transformation in the structure of 
the U.S. military (INSS Special Report, 2007: 6).  
There has also been significant discussion concerning the timing of the military 
transfer between U.S. and ROK at the White House on September 14, 2006. This resulted 
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in the need to restructure the alliance between the U.S. and the ROK. Recently, the ROK 
is looking ahead to identify further ways in which the two countries can work together to 
realize our goals and face shared challenges based on the strong bonds of friendship and 
common political values as following statement: 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a key ally of the United States in Asia and 
around the world. Like us, the ROK is dedicated to maintaining regional security 
and to promoting peace and stability around the globe. But our alliance represents 
more than a defensive balance of power. It is also a positive force for progress. 
We now have a historic opportunity to transform our alliance to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century including both traditional and new security, 
economic, and transnational challenges (Christopher Hill, Sep 2006). 
 
Looking further into the future, the restructuring of the U.S. and ROK military alliance 
could evolve toward not only a new cooperative structure of security in Northeast Asia 
but also a shifting of more responsibility to the ROK’s armed forces to defend the Korean 
Peninsula in time of crisis (DISAM Journal, February 2007). 
 
Endeavor of Military Buildup for Self-Defense 
1) Present Government’s Direction for Military Buildup  
The former South Korean President Noh Mu Hyeon has advocated military 
reform policies of military defense from his inauguration (Lawless, 2006). Traditionally, 
self-reliant defense had been desired to enable a nation to protect itself by one’s own 
power alone. However currently, it is impossible to protect a nation by oneself, and 
cooperation with friendly nations is needed (Lee, 2005).  
To secure peace on the Korean peninsula, the present government of South Korea 
should establish a strong, self-reliant defense while sustaining the alliance with the U.S. 
as a priority (Lee, 2005). That is to say, the national security goals of cooperative self-
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reliant defense are the management of the alliance and the strengthening of the nation’s 
defense. In particular from the view of self-reliant defense, it is crucial that South Korea 
develop the necessary war potential to control North Korea’s military strength (Lee, 
2005). 
 
2) Opening New Agency for Acquisition: DAPA 
In Jan 2006, the South Korean government established a new agency called the 
Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), which is charged with providing 
military supplies and acquiring weapon systems from foreign countries.  
This project originated in 2003 as part of a military reform because South Korea 
realized that efficient weapon system acquisition is the foundation for building strong 
military power. DAPA was set up to integrate several departments dispersed throughout 
the Ministry of National Defense, Army, Air Force, and Navy.  
South Korea established DAPA with the goal of contributing to the national interest 
by pursuing customer-centric defense acquisition programs and enhancing two-fold the 
military’s transparency, efficiency, expertise, and competitiveness by 2010. The 
increasing number of weapon systems imported from foreign countries results in a 
weakened South Korea’s R&D and military industry. 
In order to overcome these problems, DAPA established two objectives. The first 
objective is to increase defense R&D instead of purchasing from foreign countries if 
circumstances allow. To do this, DAPA will strengthen competitiveness in the defense 
industry and will join academic institutions with industry to develop core technology. 
The second objective is to promote transparent procedures and efficiency. DAPA will 
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pursue obtaining technology with more offsets to improve its technology when it buys 
weapon systems from foreign countries. From these fundamental concepts, South Korea 
will increase defense R&D as well as strive for growth in its domestic military industries. 
 
3) Defense Reform 2020 
The South Korean government setup the plan reforming the defense structure for 
preparation of cooperative self reliant defense by 2020. This plan includes projects for 
possessing new and core technology weapon systems to provide a strong, self-reliant 
defense. The key desire is to secure technological information from the U.S. and have 
operational power for executing war through one’s own ability (Dong-A Newspaper, 
2006).  
This implies that South Korea will need much new technology and more and better 
weapon systems in the future. These new weapon systems will be supplied both by R&D 
domestic industries and by purchasing from foreign countries through Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). 
 
4) Need for Promoting of South Korea Military Indigenous Production 
No country is able to defend itself without support and alliances with other countries. 
This is also true in the case of South Korea. There are always some mutual benefits and 
interests behind any alliance and military ties. But few alliances are strong and long-
lasting (Seo, 1997). For example, we saw how South Vietnam was conquered by the 
communist North Vietnamese regime in the1970’s. South Vietnam was very dependent 
on the U.S., but after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, it surrendered eventually because it 
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did not have any military production of its own. South Korea might follow the same path 
if it does not start developing its own independent military power, because it can no 
longer exclusively rely on the alliance with the U.S in the future (Ro, 1975).  
Moreover, it is time to look again at ROK military strategies and policies because of 
the recent changes both in the world and the region. South Korea’s priorities in military 
and politics have changed drastically in recent years. It no longer needs the simple 
weapon system that was provided by the U.S. in the early 1960s. Rather, South Korea 
needs to have high technology weapon systems from the U.S. in order to keep the 
alliance strong and cope with future circumstances (Seo, 1997).  
South Korea also has to deal with North Korea, the main enemy of South Korea even 
today. However, there might come a time in the near future when the two Koreas will 
unite.  If so, what countries could be the main enemies for Korea at that time? As stated 
above, China and Japan could build an alliance and change the whole dynamics, not only 
in the Northeast Asian region, but also in the world at large as other countries must cope 
with coming dangerous situations (Kwun, 1999). To avoid the inevitable future problems 
mentioned above, South Korea definitely needs to have its own military production 
capability soon. 
 
Research Question & Investigative Questions 
In order to establish a clear direction for the research and a framework for data 
analysis, several research questions were developed. This study was guided by the 
following overarching research question: 
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What factors explain what the ROK military considers in deciding to purchase a 
major weapon system from foreign countries? How can various factors explain main 
weapon programs to achieve future weapon systems? 
The following investigative questions were established to provide a means for 
answering the research question. They served as guides for the development of the 
interview questions in that they directed the nature of the inquiries. 
1. What are the most important factors that contribute to ROK’s decision making in 
the procurement of defense articles? 
2. Would any significant differences be affected by factors between the U.S. and 
other countries’ programs? 
3. In general, are there any significant differences that are affected by factors among 
the Army, Navy and Air Force? 
4. Which factors best each program? 
 
Research Objective 
Today, the ROK military has to reach many decisions concerning purchasing any 
of the many military systems produced by foreign countries. The reason for the 
preference for purchasing from some foreign countries’ relates to the various political, 
military and economic advantages derived from the U.S. and the other countries using the 
same military equipment. This thesis addresses the question of how various factors can 
explain main weapon programs to achieve future weapon systems while simultaneously 
building long-term indigenous industrial capability. 
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The decision process must consider various factors to include system 
interoperability, cost, performance, delivery schedule, lifecycle logistics support, and 
industrial utilization, as well as the political implications of the selected source such as 
U.S.-ROK Alliance, Northeast Asia Strategy, and Defense Budget Levels. For all these, 
the ROK military must rank the priorities in their selection process and diligently 
evaluate the relative advantages. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to promote one procurement method over 
another. In reality, what method is best for the ROK military depends on a number of 
factors. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the various factors that should be 
considered in making the FMS/DCS decision. By understanding these factors and 
applying them to the ROK military situation, a better decision can be made regarding 
which method offers the best approach for a future acquisition program.  
 
Methodology 
 Interviews were conducted with DAPA personnel who carry out the combined 
functions of weapons procurement and munitions supply. A series of questions was 
presented to personnel who had significant acquisition experience with each specific 
program. For each program, case studies provided valuable insight into lessons learned 
by personnel involved with past contract initiatives. Each expert provided a big picture 
view that confirmed lessons learned from multiple programs. Therefore, interviews were 
conducted with two experts in each program.  
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Summary 
This chapter introduced the history and current situation of Korea as they relate to 
weapons procurement,  presented the research and investigative questions, and provided a 
summary of the ROK’s acquisition situation and methodologies, and described the 
research objective. Chapter II presents an in-depth review of the existing literature on the 
subjects of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. Chapter III further 
describes the research and data collection methodologies used to accomplish the 
objectives of this study. Chapter IV presents the findings and analysis, While Chapter V 
provides conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
In today’s global economy, the ROK military is a large purchaser of FMS and 
DCS military systems produced by the foreign countries. The selection process must 
consider many factors including system interoperability, cost, performance, delivery 
schedule, lifecycle logistics support, and industrial utilization as well as the political 
implications of the selected source. The ROK military must rank the priorities in their 
selection process and evaluate the relative benefits and shortcomings of the systems from 
the historical perspective, organizational perspectives, and the FMS process. 
This chapter prescribes procedures of U.S. defense articles and reviews previous 
research to explain the U.S. acquisition process and development history, especially the 
comparison of FMS and DCS programs, then, looks briefly at the history of military 
transfer development between the U.S. and South Korea.  
 
Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales  
 In the case of the U.S., the DoD is officially neutral regarding the choice of other 
countries to purchase from them via foreign military sales or direct commercial sales. 
Under law, U.S. military systems can be purchased through the FMS process or through 
DCS. Table 1 and 2, will compare the FMS and DCS process. 
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Table 1: Foreign Military Sales – Potential Advantages and Consideration 
Source: DISAM’s Online Green Book, 2007: 15-10 
Potential Advantages Considerations 
● Total package approach based on U.S. 
military experience 
● Purchaser must decide whether the total 
package may exceed its needs or 
financial capabilities 
● USG uses its own procurement 
procedures and acts as procurement agent 
for foreign countries 
● Sophisticated foreign purchasing staff 
may achieve better overall deal by 
negotiating directly with the contractor 
● Proven and established logistics support 
for items common to DoD 
● Contractor may be able to offer a similar 
range of contractor logistics support 
● Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
economic order quantity buys, use of 
GFE or GFM tends to reduce price 
● Compliance with DoD procedures also 
tends to increase lead times, thus 
emphasizing need for country planning 
to start procurement process earlier 
● Facilitates establishment of design 
configuration and enhances potential for 
standardization 
● Purchaser must decide on the degree of 
standardization required for a purchase 
● Purchaser pays only the actual cost to 
DoD with profits controlled by the FAR 
● While initial LOA estimates tend, in the 
aggregate, to be higher than final LOA 
costs, final costs fluctuate both 
● Cross-leveling on the FMS trust fund can 
maximize use of country funds 
● Firm fixed price contracts and fixed 
payment schedules can be obtained 
under direct commercial contracts 
● Quality control to assure item meets 
MILSPECs is done by USG personnel 
● This service can be purchased under 
FMS for certain commercial contracts 
● Items may be available from DoD stocks 
in times of emergency 
● Availability is significantly dependent on 
DoD’s own priorities  
● Government-to-government obligation, 
assuring involvement of DoD personnel 
in military planning. 
● Due to the political climate, the 
purchaser may prefer procuring from the 
U.S. contractor rather than the USG 
● Better access to training at U.S. military 
schools 
● Purchaser can procure hardware under 
commercial contract, and generally 
obtain associated training at U.S. 
military schools via FMS 
● Availability of end item, facilities, 
maintenance capabilities, configuration 
control, technical data, modifications, 
and catalog information  
● Arrangements for maintaining 
configuration commonality with DoD 
could be requirements in the DCS 
contract 
● FMS customers can use ILCS system ● Commercial customers must rely on the commercial telecommunications  
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Table 2: Direct Commercial Sales – Potential Advantages and Considerations 
Potential Advantages Considerations 
● Potential for fixed delivery or fixed 
price, with penalty if contractor fails 
● Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators 
● Business-to-business relationship allows 
country to negotiate cost and contract 
terms 
● If closer military-to-military 
relationships are a purchaser’s objective, 
FMS provides an avenue to achieve this 
objective 
● Direct negotiations with contractor can 
result in a quicker response 
● Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators 
● Generally better support for nonstandard 
items 
● Purchaser must decide upon desired 
degree of standardization with U.S. 
forces 
● More capability to tailor package to 
unique country needs 
● Tailored package may detract from 
standardization desires 
● Continuity of personal contacts with 
contractor technical personnel 
● Value of continuity must be compared to 
the value of direct military-to-military 
contacts 
● New equipment directly from production 
line 
● Option exists to request only new and 
unused items via FMS 
● Lower process possible under certain 
circumstance 
● Final price may be dependent on 
experience and sophistication of country 
contract negotiators 
● Generally fixed payment schedule which 
eases budgeting problems 
● Payment schedules may be more front-
loaded than under FMS 
● Purchaser can include offset provision in 
one contract 
● Purchaser can negotiate offsets (directly 
with contractor) and still procure under 
FMS 
● FMS administrative surcharge and DoD 
Management costs can be avoided 
● Purchaser must consider entire cost of 
transaction, including its contracting 
staff costs and possibly increased 
contractor administrative costs 
● Commercial purchases of some types of 
items could help to create and develop a 
procurement capability 
● Scarcity of resources and time may not 
allow for this type of on-job training for 
procurement staffs 
Source: DISAM’s Online Green Book, 2007:15-11 
 
The FMS and DCS systems are simply different contracting methods which a 
foreign government may employ for the purchase of U.S. defense articles and services. In 
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the commercial case, a U.S. contractor and a foreign government enter into a direct 
contract in accordance with U.S. law and regulations and provisions of international 
commercial law. The USG is not a party to these commercial contractual transactions. 
The foreign government has the responsibility in such purchases to select the source and 
manage the contract directly with the U.S. contractor (DISAM’s Online Green Book, 
2007: 15-8). 
Under the FMS system, the USG and the foreign purchaser enter into an 
agreement which specifies the terms and conditions of the sale. Thereafter, except for 
items supplied directly from the DoD inventory, the USG buys the desired item or 
weapon system from the U.S. manufacturer or the system was being purchased for U.S. 
needs. The USG, not the foreign government, selects the source and manages the contract, 
consistent with the provisions of the FAR and the LOA (DISAM’s Online Green Book, 
2007: 15-8). 
In reviewing the pertinent factors associated with the two procurement systems, 
one should bear in mind that unless the Department of State has determined that a 
specific item or service will only be offered via FMS, there are few absolutes which 
dictate that all countries should select exclusively either FMS or commercial channels for 
a given purchase requirement. Rather, there are many considerations, unique both to the 
individual purchaser and to the items being procured, that are involved in such a choice. 
The final decision on purchasing channels varies from country to country, and even from 
purchase to purchase. Given the variety of factors involved, it is important that the 
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purchasing government’s decision encompass as many factual considerations as possible 
(DISAM’s Online Green Book 2007: 15-9). 
 
Foreign Military Sales Program Overview  
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is defined as a process through which eligible 
foreign governments and international organizations may purchase defense articles and 
services from the United States Government (FMS Customer Financial Management 
Handbook, 2007). It is the largest program of the overall U.S. security assistance program. 
The FMS government-to-government agreement is documented on an LOA. FMS is 
accomplished in two basic ways, as follows: 
• FMS cash purchases whereby the purchaser pays in cash (U.S. dollars) all costs 
that may be associated with a sale. 
• Foreign military financing (FMF) wherein U.S. government grants/non-
repayable and repayable loans are involved. These credit/loan arrangements are 
negotiated by the foreign government and the U.S. government. 
The U.S. government provides the articles or services from stock, but often will issue a 
contract with industry to acquire the items or services for subsequent delivery to the FMS 
customer. In this case, the U.S. government is acting on the FMS customer’s behalf 
(DISAM, 2007) 
Then why does the U.S. government have a FMS program? There are many 
reasons. Since World War II, the United States has provided various forms of security 
assistance to other nations in furtherance of the principle of collective security. In 
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furtherance of this principle, section 1 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
establishes the rationale for FMS: 
There Congress recognizes…that the United States and other free and 
independent countries continue to have valid requirements for effective and 
mutually beneficial defense relationships…Because of the growing cost and 
complexity of defense equipment, it is increasingly difficult and uneconomic for 
any country, particularly a developing country, to fill all of its legitimate defense 
requirements from its own design and production base (DISAM, 2007) 
 
There are many benefits that resulted in the FMS purchasing countries and the United 
States as a result of FMS. Some of these benefits include: 
• Lowered unit production costs and shared research and development costs. 
• Progress toward standardization and interoperability of equipment between the 
United States and friendly foreign nations. 
• Utilization of Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements by selected 
countries, which permits support of the foreign nation’s equipment from U.S. 
stocks on an equal basis with comparable U.S. forces having a similar mission. 
 
Historical Perspective of Foreign Military Sales 
The military support to foreign alliances by the U.S. began in World War Ⅱ. The 
United States has always maintained non-entanglement and non-commitment policies 
from foreign wars (DISAM Online Green Book, 2007). However, in 1939 Congress 
revised the “Neutrality Act,” thereby permitting the sale of arms during peacetime to the 
British on a cash-and-carry basis. The next major U.S. decision for the British was the 
“Lend-Lease” program initiated by an Act of Congress on March 11, 1941. Lend-Lease 
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eventually supplied about $50 billion of arms, food, and other aid to Allies, including, as 
they became engaged in the war, the Russians and the Chinese (DISAM, 2003: 17-20).  
Table 3: Change in Policy for Weapon Sales 
Source: DISAM Online Green Book, 2007: A2 1-18 
After this, the U.S. changed the FMS policy coincident with the changing world 
environment. The change of weapon sales is shown by period in Table 3. 
This FMS program is based on the U.S. Security Assistance Program which 
includes general defense services. It is necessary that we should know the change of the 
Security Assistance Program to understand the FMS program more. 
Periods President Situation / Basic Policy Practice 
1945’s~1950’s 
•Truman 
•Eisenhower 
•Check from threat of 
Communism 
•Protect Alliances 
• The methods for protecting from Soviet.
• Stockpiles of surplus : free of charge 
1960’s 
•Kennedy 
•Johnson 
•The policy of “massive 
retaliation” against Soviets 
• Improve revenue 
•Reduce stockpile post war 
• Change freeÆpay 
• Sales promotion actively to the 
according to the country’s ability 
1970’s 
•Nixon 
•Ford 
•Carter 
• Control the sales  weapon 
• Negative perspective for weapon 
sale 
• Make regulations Congress permission  
•Continue sale to sustain check for 
communism and relationship with 
alliances 
1980’s •Reagan 
•Arms transfer as an essential 
element global defense policy 
•Improve the U.S. economy by 
stable defense production base 
• Increase sales weapon 
•Reinforce military capabilities to assist in 
the deterrence of aggression from the 
USSR 
1990’s 
•Bush 
•Clinton 
•Collapse Iron Curtain 
•Serious domestic economic 
problem 
•mutual burden 
•New arms transfer policy include the 
promotion of control and transparency 
• The excess sales weapon is negative for 
U.S. security 
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Figure 1: U.S. Security Assistance Program Change (Lee, 2001) 
 
The U.S. Security Assistance program was started by the “Lend-Lease program” in 
1941. It was amended to the Mutual Security Act in 1951, the Foreign Military Sales Act 
in 1968, and reformed as the Arms Export Control Act in 1976 (see Figure 1). The most 
recent changes that are applicable to the current research are discussed below: 
 
1. Foreign Assistance Act (1968): FAA 
The Foreign Assistance Act was made by amending the previous act which 
assisted military and economic programs. The Foreign Assistance Act stated clearly 
Lend – Lease Program : 1941 
National Security Act: 1947 
European Recovery Plan: 1948 
Mutual Security Act: 1951 
Foreign Assistance Act: 1961 
Foreign Military Sales Act: 1968 
Arms Export Control Act: 1976 
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that U.S. security might be strengthened more by ensuring the alliances’ security. By 
this Act, the U.S. could provide all the assistance such as lease, exchange, free 
charge military aids, loan, and sale without limitation if needed. (DISAM Online 
Green Book, 2007) 
 
2. Foreign Military Sales Act (1968): FMSA 
The Foreign Military Sales Act was made by separating Military sales from the 
Foreign Assistance Act. Before 1968, the basic authority for foreign military sales 
was the FAA. This Act enabled the U.S. legalized unit law for defense material sales 
including co-production to the alliances and the international organization. (DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2007) 
 
3. Arms Export Control Act (1976): AECA 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 changed the title of the FMSA to the 
AECA. This 1976 Act also repealed the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (which 
provided authority for commercial licensing through the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulation); this authority was placed in a new Control of Arms Exports and 
Imports of the AECA which governs the licensing and sale of items through direct 
commercial channels. The AECA is the statuary basis for the conduct of foreign 
military sales and the control of commercial sales of defense articles and services. 
And the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 changed the title of the FMSA to the 
AECA. This Act makes clear that the U.S. can exercise initiative for reducing 
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strengthening the defense technology and the competitiveness of the defense industry are 
as follows: 
1) Reinforcement of R&D in the National Defense 
Future battle field environments are drastically changing due to the introduction of 
new technology. At the same time developed countries are not willing to transfer core 
technologies. What is more, Korea's national defense research and development 
environment is rapidly changing due to changes in the domestic security environment, 
radical changes in science and technology, and improvements in national R&D 
capabilities. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration plans to continually 
expand national defense research and development along with core technology 
development to ensure our armed forces are highly developed elite forces as well as build 
independent defense strength. 
 
2) Prioritization of Domestic R&D 
In order to sustain economic growth and develop our country's national 
competitiveness in this ever competing world, we should develop domestic technology 
first. Therefore, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, to effectively perform 
industry creation, production, and acquisition, first adopts civil standards when there are 
two different standards between national defense and civil groups and find a way to use 
national defense and civil technologies in a cooperative fashion. What is more, by 
pursuing the development of joint technology of national defense and civil groups at a 
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pan-government level, it maximizes the synergistic effect of research and development 
and raises the effectiveness of technology investments.  
 
3) Reinforcement of the Global Competitiveness of the Acquisition Program 
The Defense Acquisition Program Administration reinforces collaboration with 
national science and technology within national science and technology innovation 
systems in order to establish and execute national defense research, development methods 
and prepare the foundation for the promotion of national defense science and technology.  
 
4) Strengthening the Cooperation with the Nation-Wide Science and Technology 
Because of recent changes in the domestic and international defense industry 
environment, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration abolishes it policy of 
defense industry protection and nurturing. This policy weakens the competitiveness of the 
existing defense industry and abolishing it will help develop a reasonable defense 
industry based on competition. However, in the event that the current system becomes 
extremely competitive, DAPA encourages the industry not to hoard their know-how and 
invested facilities. In that situation, DAPA also establishes a system that will protect 
small and medium enterprises with relatively weak competitiveness and duplicated 
investment due to over-heated competition. Furthermore, DAPA plans to manage items 
requiring secure acquisition such as major strategic weapon systems so as not to create 
any problems regarding the war potential of the armed forces.  
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5) Expansion of Expert Support for the Defense Industry 
Defense industry product export is one of the objectives of the establishment of the 
Defense Acquisition Program Administration. DAPA plans to foster pan-governmental 
international cooperation along with a market expansion system to increase export. It also 
supports the export marketing departments of each defense industry enterprise as well as 
promotes association with the KOTRA (Korea Trade-investment Promotion Agency). 
The National Assembly, the government, the armed forces, and industry concentrate all 
their efforts and seek distinctive export revitalization methods for each country. To 
achieve these principles, the summary of DAPA organization and process are shown in 
each Figure 3, Figure 4 (DAPA Online official homepage, http://www.dapa.go.kr/eng). 
 
 
Figure 3: Organization of Defense Acquisition Program Administration 
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Figure 4: DAPA Procurement Process from Foreign Countries 
 
U.S. Government Organization for FMS 
 In U.S. government organization for security assistance, the president is 
responsible for all of the activities of the executive branch as the chief executive. The 
president has numerous assistants, cabinet officers, and other subordinate officials to 
oversee the conduct of the U.S. security assistance program. 
 
1) Department of State 
  In accordance with section 2 of the AECA (Arms Export Control Act), the 
Secretary of State is responsible for: 
● The continuous supervision and general direction of sales (FMS) and 
commercial exports licensed under the AECA 
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● Determining whether there shall be a sale to a country and the amount, and the 
under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology is the 
principal advisor and focal point for security assistance(including FMS) matters 
within the Department of State. 
 
2) Department of Defense 
 The overall security assistance program is under the supervision and general 
direction of the U.S. Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of Defense is responsible 
for administering certain security assistance program elements, one of which is FMS. In 
accordance with the AECA, the Secretary of Defense has primary responsibility for: 
● The determination of military end-item requirements 
● The procurement of FMS in a manner which permits its integration  
● The supervision of the training of foreign military personnel 
● The movement and delivery of military end items 
● Within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with 
respect to sales and guarantees 
 
3) Department of Treasury 
 The Department of Treasury is involved in FMS in the following ways 
 
● Receiving and reviewing periodic reports of accountability from the Security 
Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC) 
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● Overseeing the functions of the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) which provides 
guaranteed loans to finance FMS and commercial export sales 
● Setting the rate of interest in the event of FMS payment arrearages on the part 
of the foreign government 
 
4) Congress 
 The Congress of the U.S. is vested with all legislative powers. With regard to 
conventional arms transfers/sales, which constitute a major dimension of the U.S security 
framework, the Constitution assigns Congress the power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations. In terms of FMS, Congress has the authority for approving sales of MDE 
(Major Defense Equipment). 
 
5) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
 DSCA is the main agency for managing FMS. It is established as a separate 
agency of the DoD under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy and receives policy direction and staff supervision and is responsible 
for: 
● Determination with respect to the allocation of FMS administrative funds 
● Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries 
● Serving as the DoD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry  
In addition to the above, there are many separate agencies which connect with 
FMS, and these organizations play a crucial role for granting and managing FMS. These 
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organizations and processes are operated in the system of Security Assistance. The 
summary of government organizations for Security Assistance is shown in Figure 5 
(DISAM Online Green Book, 2007: 3-2). 
 
 
Figure 5: United State Government Organization for Security Assistance 
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FMS Process 
 Much of the literature discussed above applies in various phases. However, the 
DISAM book mentions the core process briefly and demonstrates it in below. The FMS 
process is divided into three supporting processes as below: 
 
1) Letter of Request (LOR) / Offer (LOO) Process 
LOR is a formal diplomatic letter requesting articles, military construction, or other 
services submitted by an eligible foreign country. LOR must be reviewed and validated 
by the military department, Defense Security Cooperative Agency (DSCA), and the 
Department of State, to ensure that the prospective FMS purchaser is eligible, that the 
articles/services may be sold, and that the request went through proper channels. 
After LOR is approved, the IA (Implementing Agency, e.g., U.S Army, Air Force, 
Navy, etc.) definitizes the Purchaser’s requirements in the form of a Price and 
Availability (P&A) data worksheet and develops a Letter of Offer (LOO). The price is 
developed in accordance with current pricing practice and is based upon the IA’s 
understanding of the customer’s requirements. The Purchaser, in accordance with the 
stated terms and conditions on the LOO, agrees to pay all costs once determined. 
 
2) Letter of Acceptance (LOA) / Implementation Process 
Once the FMS Purchaser accepts/signs the LOO, it becomes a Letter of Acceptance 
(LOA). Upon receipt of the signed LOA and, if required, an initial deposit, SAAC 
(Security Assistance Accounting Center) is in position to issue Obligational Authority 
(OA) to the IA. OA enables the IA to prepare requisitions that will result in Material 
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Release Orders (MROs). Most FMS cases are implemented by means of an IA 
implementing directive. 
 
3) Execution / Performance Reporting Process 
Performance on a FMS case is demonstrated to the FMS purchaser through the 
receipt of status cards, or the quarterly requisition report from the IA, or the reporting of 
the performance/delivery in the Delivery Listing accompanying each quarterly FMS 
Billing Statement. The FMS process and periods are described in Table 4 (DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2007: 5-2). 
Table 4: Foreign Military Sales Process 
PROCESS CONTENTS 
Preliminary (Indefinite) • Customer determines requirements.  • Customer obtains specific systems information. 
Definition (Indefinite) • Customer and U.S. exchange tech information. 
Request (Indefinite) 
• Customer prepares and submits a letter of request 
(LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data.  
• Customer prepares and submits LOR for a letter of 
offer and acceptance (LOA). 
Development of Offer 
(Policy for the response to LOR by 
LOA is 120 days for 80% of LORs) 
• Implementing agency (IA) receives the LOR.  
• State/DSCA/Congress review LOA.  
• IA issues LOA to customer. 
Acceptance of the Offer 
(Policy is 60 days to accept a LOA) 
• Customer signs LOA.  
• Customer sends signed copy of LOA and initial 
deposit to DFAS-DE.  
• Customer sends signed copy of LOA to IA. 
Implementation 
(15 days average.) 
• DFAS-DE issues obligational authority (OA).  
• IA issues implementing directive.  
• IA activates FMS computer systems. 
Execution 
(Depends on delivery schedule.) 
• Case and line managers order articles. 
• Articles and services shipped and expended. 
Training conducted.  
Reconciliation and Closure 
(Policy is 2 years from last delivery.) 
• MILDEP/DFAS-DE and customer reconcile 
records.  
• MILDEP sends closure certificate to DFAS-DE.  
• DFAS-DE issue final bill to customer. 
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Summary 
This chapter summarized the ROK military procurement process for weapon systems 
from foreign countries. This chapter also presented the organizations and FMS process so 
that the selection process of foreign weapon systems considering many factors. Also this 
chapter detailed the comparison of FMS and DCS Programs with the history of military 
transfer development between the U.S. and South Korea. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter begins by presenting the research design and describing the research 
methods used to conduct the study. Next, the purpose of qualitative research and the 
methods of qualitative research are addressed with emphasis on each definition. Finally, 
the interview questions are analyzed, along with an explanation of the standardized 
questions used to make the comparisons. 
 
Qualitative Research Purpose 
 One of the chief reasons for conducting a qualitative study is that the study is 
exploratory, not much has been written about the topic or population being studied, and 
the researcher seeks to listen to informants and to build a picture based on their ideas 
(Creswell, 1994). Qualitative research refers to any kind of study that makes findings not 
arrived by means of statistical procedures or any other means of quantification (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). Qualitative methodology provides rich “context-bound” information 
leading to patterns or theories that help explain a phenomenon (Creswell, 1994). The 
Table 5 discusses several of the qualitative research purposes (Peshkin, 1993). 
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Table 5: Purposes of Qualitative Research 
Factors Qualitative Research Purpose 
Description 
Reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships, systems, or 
people 
Interpretation 
Gain insight about the nature of a particular phenomenon, develop new concepts or 
theoretical perspectives about the phenomenon, and/or discover the problems that exist 
within a phenomenon 
Verification 
Allow the researcher to test the validity of certain assumptions, claims, theories, or 
generalizations within real-world contexts  
Evaluation 
Provide a means through which a researcher can judge the effectiveness of particular 
policies, practices, innovations 
Source: Peshkin 1993 
Research Design & Methods 
 A research design is as “a blueprint of research, dealing with at least four 
problems: what questions to study, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how 
to analyze the results” (Philliber, Schwab, & Samsloss, 1980). According to Yin (2003), 
the main purpose of the design is to help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does 
not address the initial research questions (Yin, 2003). Through the right research design 
dealing with a logical problem, the research could avoid incorrect conclusions.  
 The case study was selected for this research because “Case study is the preferred 
strategy when “how” or “why” questions are used, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (Yin, 2003). The research question in this effort is “how and why are certain 
contracts chosen as defense articles considering main factors?” this research will address 
this question by investigating “how and why certain factors influenced decisions to 
purchase defense weapon systems from other countries?” The data for this study comes 
from individuals who participated in each defense weapon program. 
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Yin (2003) states five components of a research design: 
A research design should include five components….the complete research 
design should not only indicate what data are to be collected-as indicated by (a) a 
study’s questions, (b) its propositions, and (c) its units of analysis. The design also 
should tell you what is to be done after the data have been collected-as indicated 
by (d) the logic linking the data to the propositions and (e) the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003: 28). 
 
The first component, the study’s questions, provides an important clue regarding the most 
relevant research strategy based on “why”. As for the second component, study 
proposition directs attention to something that should be examined within the scope of 
the study. Therefore, this study is not appropriate to study proposition because study 
proposition’s topic is the subject of “exploration” for exploratory case study. The unit of 
analysis, as the third component, is related to the fundamental problem of defining what 
the “case” is. This research’s unit of analysis is on each defense weapon program 
between the ROK and foreign countries. Each program is the primary unit of analysis. 
Information about six programs should be included in a multiple-case study. Yin (2003) 
states that “selection of the appropriate unit of analysis will occur when you accurately 
specify your primary research questions.” The logic linking data to propositions and 
criteria for interpreting the findings, as the final two components, are “the least well 
developed in case studies. These components foreshadow the data analysis steps in case 
study research, and a research design would lay a solid foundation for this analysis.” (Yin, 
2003). 
The data for this study are qualitative in nature; therefore a qualitative design will 
serve best to answer the research question of this study. According to Creswell(1994), the 
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six assumptions of qualitative research should be addressed. The following Table 6 lists 
the assumptions and explains the research characteristics. 
Table 6: Assumptions of Qualitative Designs 
Assumption Research Characteristic Addressing Assumption 
Process oriented  Study of the process and implementation of defense acquisition  
Focus on meaning Focus on identifying the main factors that consider in deciding to purchase a major defense weapon system from other countries 
Research is the primary instrument Researcher must review published data, conduct interview with experienced experts of defense purchases 
Involves fieldwork Conduct telephone interview with Korean experts  
Descriptive in nature Purpose is to explain the various factors that contribute to ROK’s decision making in procurement of defense articles 
Inductive  There is no current data on how ROK have been able to decide to purchase a defense weapon articles 
Source: Creswell, 1994  
 In a case study, especially qualitative research represents a specific method of 
collecting, organizing, and analyzing data. In a qualitative study, Creswell refers to 
“pattern theories” as an explanation that develops during qualitative research. Rather than 
the deductive form found in quantitative studies, these pattern theories represent a 
“pattern” of interconnected thoughts or parts linked to a whole (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Neuman provides additional information about pattern theories: 
Pattern theory does not emphasize logical deductive reasoning. Like causal theory, 
it contains an interconnected set of concepts and relationships, but it does not 
require causal statements. Instead, pattern theory uses metaphor or analogies so 
that relationship “makes sense.” Pattern theories are systems of ideas that inform. 
The concepts and relations within them form a mutually reinforcing, closed 
system. They specify a sequence of phases or link parts to a whole (Neuman, 
1991) 
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 The analysis of case study data is typically a five-step process, as described by the 
following Table 7. 
Table 7: Five-Step Process 
Steps Five-Step Process 
1. Organization of details about the case The specific facts about the case are arraigned in a logical order 
2. Categorization of the data 
Categories are identified that help cluster the data in to 
meaningful groups 
3. Interpretation of single instances 
Specific documents, occurrences, and other bits of data are 
examined for the specific meanings that they might have in 
relation to the case 
4. Identification of patterns 
The data and their interpretations are scrutinized for underlying 
themes and other patterns that characterize the case more 
broadly than a single piece of information can  
5. Synthesis and generalization 
An overall portrait of the case is constructed. Conclusions are 
drawn that may have implications beyond the specific case that 
has been studied 
Source: Creswell, 1994 
Yin’s multiple case study method described below in Figure 6 (YIN, 2003: 50). 
The Figure 6 indicates that the initial step in designing the study must consist of theory 
development and then shows that case selection and the definition of specific measures 
are important steps in the design and data collection process. Each individual case study 
consists of a “whole” study, in which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts 
and conclusions for the case. The multiple-case results can and should be the focus of a 
summary report. For each individual case, the report should indicate how and why a 
particular proposition was demonstrated. Across cases, the report should indicate the 
extent of the replication logic and why certain cases were predicted to have certain results, 
whereas other cases, if any, were predicted to have contrasting results (Yin, 2003). For 
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Table 8: Qualitative Data Collection Types, Options, Advantages, and Limitations 
Data Types Options  Strengths Weaknesses 
Observations 
Complete participant  
Observer as participant 
Participant as observer 
Complete observer 
Researcher has firsthand 
experience with informant. 
Researcher can record 
information as it occurs. 
Unusual aspects can be 
noticed during observation. 
Researcher may be seen as 
intrusive. 
Researcher may not have good 
attending and observing skills. 
Interviews 
Face-to-face: one on one, 
in person interview 
Telephone: researcher 
interviews by phone 
Group: researcher 
interviews informants in a 
group 
Useful when informants 
cannot be directly observed. 
Informants can provide 
historical information. 
Allows researcher “control” 
over the line of questioning. 
Provides “indirect” information 
filtered through the views of 
interviewees. 
Provides information in a 
designated “place,” rather than 
the natural field setting. 
Researcher’s presence may bias 
responses. 
Not all people are equally 
articulate and perceptive. 
Documents 
Public documents such as 
minutes of meetings, 
newspapers 
Private documents such as 
journal or diary, letter 
Enables a researcher to 
obtain the language and 
words of informants. 
Can be accessed at a time 
convenient to researcher. 
It saves a researcher the time 
and expense of transcribing. 
May be protected information 
unavailable to public or private 
access. 
Requires the researcher to search 
out the information in hard-to-
find places. 
Requires transcribing or optically 
scanning for computer entry 
Materials may be incomplete. 
Audiovisual 
Materials 
Photographs 
Videotapes 
Art objects 
Computer software  
Film 
May be an unobtrusive 
method of collecting data 
Provides an opportunity for 
informant to share directly 
his or her “reality.” 
Creative in that it captures 
attention visually. 
May be difficult to interpret. 
May not be accessible publicly or 
privately. 
The presence of an observer may 
be disruptive and affect responses
Source: Creswell, 1994: 150 
 This research selects the interview technique as its major method of data 
collection. This interview technique provided valuable insight into lessons learned by 
knowledgeable personnel associated with each programs from Defense Acquisition 
Program Administration (DAPA). According to Yin (2003), “the interview is one of the 
most important sources of evidence for the case study.” Therefore, availability and 
willingness of the respondent to participate in a timely manner was the most significant 
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consideration for this interview-intensive research methodology. The study incorporated 
interviews with personnel from the Army, Air Force, and Navy, as well as several 
defense contractors. The majority of interviews were initially coordinated based upon 
recommendations from the thesis advisor, Lt Col Stanley E. Griffis. Based on 
recommendations from the thesis advisor, 12 contractors were contacted based on the 
Army, Air Force, and Navy. Interviews were conducted with each program’s experts who 
have had significant experience (preferably at least 5 years). Although not every 
interviewee worked at the senior levels of organization, all personnel had a respectable 
amount of experience with defense weapons contract-related career fields. Altogether, the 
interviewees possessed an average of approximately 10 years of experience in acquisition 
department. The selected contractors were interviewed, in an attempt to gain an unbiased 
and balanced perspective on each program. Unfortunately, this was not possible in every 
situation due to a lack of timely responses or willingness to participate from personnel 
interview over the phone.  
Before achieving interviews, an e-mail message which explained my thesis summary 
was sent to them which served as a starting point for confirming each contract with 
experts who were qualified and willing to assist with the research. So, the purpose of this 
e-mail message was not only to establish initial communication between the researcher 
and the interviewee but also to publicly endorse the research effort in hopes of soliciting 
a broader range of participation. For all these, with assistance from thesis advisor and 
DAPA contractors, certain criteria were recommended for program selection, in order to 
confirm the appropriate defense programs. Included in these criteria were: 
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• Defense weapon system 
• Only terminated programs 
• Selected programs through overseas competition 
• Include the Army, Air Force, and Navy 
• Include major & non-major defense programs 
• Include U.S. & Non-U.S. weapon system 
After verified the criteria among programs, they were organized into six programs. 
The process of choosing these programs for case studies was drawn out over several 
months. Ultimately, the 3 U.S. contract programs and the 3 Non-U.S. countries’ contract 
programs were studied, which entailed interviews with a total of 12 individuals from 
DAPA: 
1. F-X (F-15K) first program (U.S.) 
2. E-X (E-737) program (U.S.) 
3. KDX II 5-inch Warship Gun program (U.S.) 
4. WLR-X (ARTHUR) program (Sweden) 
5. KDX II (GOAL KEEPER) program (Holland) 
6. KDX I 5-inch Warship Gun program (Italy) 
 
Interview Questions 
 Interview questions were developed with the goal of comparing the 6 main 
defense programs based on the various identified factors that contribute to ROK’s 
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decision making and provide background information to allow for a basic comparison of 
the programs. The main focus of the questions centered on integration of each respective 
program’s information (see Appendix 1 for examples). 
The interview questions were changed several times to provide a framework for 
the research and guide conversations with personnel. In terms of data-gathering, they 
were intended to accomplish several goals: 
• Clearly answer the interview questions  
• Explain the limitations of the contract considering various factors 
• Understand certain criteria were suggested as guidelines in each factor 
• Clearly understand “how” or “why” questions that required exploratory 
investigation 
Participants were given the choice to answer questions over the telephone. Interview 
questions were developed into the following 13 factors with 3~4 sub-questions. By 
understanding these factors and applying them to the ROK’s specific situation, a better 
decision can be made regarding which method offers the best approach for a particular 
acquisition: 
1. Interoperability 
2. Offset Valuation 
3. Mission performance capability 
4. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) 
5. Life Cycle 
6. Timely Deployment 
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7. Depot Maintenance 
8. National Security 
9. U.S.-ROK Alliance 
10. Northeast Asia Strategy 
11. Defense Budget Levels 
12. ROK Political Environments 
13. Trends in Public Opinion  
Throughout the interviewing process, the question sets underwent several 
iterations as it became apparent that adjustments, additions, and deletions were 
required, As a result, not every interviewee was asked every question in the exact 
same manner. 
 
Summary 
This chapter provided an explanation of the methodology used to answer the basic 
research question. The research methodology is qualitative and exploratory using a 
multiple –case study approach. The chapter began with an introduction to the qualitative 
research purpose, provided research design & methods for the selection of the case study, 
discussed the data collection, and explained the interview questions. The next chapter 
will provide the findings and analysis followed by the conclusions and recommendations.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the results of the interviews and analyses of the data that 
were gathered. The content was examined with the aim of answering the investigative 
questions to look at the various factors that should be considered in ROK’s decision-
making. Interview participants at each program level were asked to express their 
program’s meaningful lessons and their degree of consideration of each factor and to 
assess the contract’s effectiveness. 
Therefore, this research details the pattern for the investigative questions which 
were combined, analyzed, and organized with tables and figures, and also discusses the 
issues that were most frequently raised by participants in the context of these interviews. 
 
Investigative Questions 
This research discusses the results within the framework of the investigative 
questions. It is challenging to summarize and exhibit the various views that respondents 
had throughout all of these programs. Therefore, this chapter uses two different tables. 
The first tables of each factor (see Table 9 for example) present the quantitative values 
assigned to each factor by the respondents within the programs evaluated. These data 
make comparisons among the programs and and between the U.S. and the other countries. 
The second tables of each factor (see Table 10 for example) express each factor’s 
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decision making criteria to provide the pattern so that this research could explain how and 
why certain factors influenced the process of each program’s decision making. As 
mentioned earlier, investigative questions were developed with the goal of comparing the 
six main defense programs based on the various factors that contribute to the ROK’s 
decision making. This chapter also provides many ideas for additional lessons that will 
help the ROK’s defense decisions to develop a process of procurement that fosters 
contract skills which promote indigenous industrial capability in the future. 
 
1. Interoperability 
Interoperability is described as the capability of two or more systems to work 
together. This means the ability of two or more items or equipment components to 
execute the same functions. In other contexts, it means the capability of complementing 
each other irrespective of the technical characteristic differences between the systems, 
and without conducting additional training for the related personnel (DAMR, Appendix 
10: 531). Table 9 shows the influence of interoperability across the programs and 
identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors 
in detail. 
1-1. Possibility of integrated operations during the combined exercises 
1-2. Possibility of systematic connection with the existing weapon systems 
1-3. Existence of the system-integrated service & construction of the 
environment for interoperability 
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Table 9: The Influence of Interoperability on Contracts 
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Interoperability 7 7 7 6 7 4 6.3 7 7 6 7 4 6 6.2 6.25 
Sub-Question 1-1 7 7 7 5 6 4 6.0 7 6 6 6 4 6 5.8 5.92 
Sub-Question 1-2 7 2 7 6 6 4 5.3 1 7 7 6 4 6 5.2 5.25 
Sub-Question 1-3 7 6 6 5 7 4 5.8 7 6 5 7 4 5 5.7 5.75 
 
As seen in Table 9, a consistently high level of consideration for interoperability 
was found among U.S. and Non-U.S. programs. That is, interoperability was mentioned 
repeatedly as a success factor for most of the programs. For this reason, the ROK military 
appears to weigh interoperability heavily in defense contracts.  
Ironically, the sub question 1-2, systematic connection with the existing weapon 
systems, was not graded as highly in the F-X program and the WLR-X program. At the 
time, the ROK military was considering a new weapon system that was first introduced to 
the ROK military, because the previous system was behind the times or not appropriate to 
eliminate a potential security vacuum in future operations. One interviewee for the WLR-
X program mentioned that “even though the Arthur from Sweden had a handicap in terms 
of an interoperability compared with the previous existing U.S. radar (the AN/TPQ-37), 
offset valuation made up for the weak point of the interoperability in that contract.”  
Simply stated though, many participants for other countries’ programs recognized 
interoperability as an influencing factor to accomplish the contract. Therefore, it seems to 
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be an obvious disadvantage to other countries’ programs in the process of contracts, 
because system upgrade costs to connect with a previous system which consists of U.S. 
articles cannot be ignored, and the upgrade total costs would reach a much higher price. 
Moreover, the consequences of the system upgrade usually include a delayed schedule 
and degraded performance. In the worst case, the ROK military would have to construct 
new logistics supply systems with the relevant country considering technical training, 
maintenance facilities and support equipment except for mission performance capability. 
However, the KDX program interviewee who had experience with both KDX-I (Italy) 
and KDX-II (U.S.) programs commented “although interoperability seems to be 
considered as an important factor in the early phase of the U.S. programs so that this 
factor seems to be against other countries’ contracts, actually this factor was not 
considered very highly at the moment as a disadvantage in the KDX-I contract with Italy 
because the KDX-I warship gun is an independent weapon system which needs to only 
match with an avionics computer system.” 
There was little evidence to suggest that interoperability is not one of the key 
issues in contracts, but the Army interviewee for the WLR-X program did not believe 
that this factor had as much of impact on contract decisions as did the price issue. On the 
contrary, the ROK military could achieve benefits from this situation which other 
countries’ contractors suppose that interoperability seems to be against other countries’ 
contracts because they already recognize and consider the U.S.-ROK alliance 
environment so that they could be more flexible to other negotiation factors, such as 
offset valuation, contract price, and the ROK military’s requirements.  
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Table 10: Interoperability related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Integrated operations during the combined exercise x x x x   4
Systematic connection with the other existing systems x x  x x x 5
Systematic connection with the previous system x  x  x  3
 
As seen in Table 10, most respondents in these programs stated that systematic 
connection or integration is the biggest enabler to accomplish interoperability in the 
contract. In the case of the Army WLR-X program, representatives expressed that they 
did not consider the interoperability with the previous equipment, the AN/TPQ-37 as a 
serious disadvantage. Because the radar system as an independent unit only needs to 
transmit its signal to a higher command, the ROK Army chose to purchase the Swedish 
artillery radar system (Arthur). Arthur will be self-contained to process target data, 
identify artillery, mortar and rockets. This means all target data can be distributed to 
relevant units in the battlefield through network centric channels. 
In the case of the E-X program, the contract objective is to send out a warning to 
land, air and sea troops simultaneously and to scan the area of operations. Therefore, the 
participants considered interoperability more highly in order to overcome the limits with 
a previous ground sensor and telecommunication such as data links and signal facilities. 
The Boeing E-737 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) has a system track 
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capability of 3,000 targets and can track land, air and sea targets simultaneously. The 
radar system also provides a high level of operational capability because the system is 
dynamically structured to match the changing mission requirements in surveillance area. 
Due in part to these factors, the ROK military signed a contract with Boeing for four E-
737 AEW&C. 
Navy interview participants agreed upon one of the interesting findings that for 
Navy programs, interoperability in terms of the possibility of integrated operations during 
joint and combined exercise was not given significant weight in program consideration 
(see Table 10). Compared with Army and Air Force programs, the interviewees for Navy 
programs mentioned that the Navy usually takes on different missions and conducts an 
independent operation so that there are not many opportunities to participate in joint, 
combined exercises with other countries. 
In conclusion, most respondents believed that this factor is best suited for 
consideration at the contract level. They believed that this factor had significant impact 
on contract decisions, and interoperability should be enhanced among U.S. allies in order 
to increase mission effectiveness. One respondent recommended that this factor should be 
emphasized more in the construction for the environment of the system-integrated service 
level. 
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2. Offset Valuation 
Recently, the offset valuation can be seen as evidence of how successfully the 
program is accomplished, and participants are directed to attempt to get more offset 
valuation whenever possible. Defense offsets are a type of counter-trade obligations 
related to the transfer of core defense technologies and component parts production 
required by the importing country as part of a large defense procurement contract for 
export of arms, equipment and related services (Defense Offset Guidelines, 2003). Table 
11 shows the influences of offset valuation over the programs and identifies its 
investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
2-1. Contributory effects on R&D 
2-2. Building up the foundation of technology for enlarging future exports 
2-3. Satisfaction of offset 
2-4. Effectiveness of cost reductions 
Table 11: The Influence of Offset Valuation on Contracts 
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Offset Valuation 7 7 3 6 6 6 5.8 7 6 5 6 4 5 5.5 5.67 
Sub-Question 2-1 4 7 2 4 7 6 5.0 6 5 3 7 4 6 5.2 5.08 
Sub-Question 2-2 5 6 2 3 5 5 4.3 3 4 3 6 3 6 4.2 4.25 
Sub-Question 2-3 7 7 6 6 6 5 6.2 7 5 3 7 3 5 5.0 5.58 
Sub-Question 2-4 5 1 3 6 6 6 4.5 7 4 6 5 4 5 5.2 4.83 
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As the scale of foreign weapon procurement contracts grows in the ROK, the 
importance of defense offsets has been recognized as an efficient way of building up 
defense strength. This is due to the fact that defense offsets provide a window of 
opportunity to obtain defense core technologies from the more advanced countries. As 
you can see in Table 11, offset valuation was mentioned repeatedly as one of the crucial 
parts of successful contracts in all of the U.S. and Non-U.S. programs. One interviewee 
for the F-X program remarked, “this factor could potentially open doors for more 
effective contracts by alleviating the ROK government budgetary concerns and building 
long-term indigenous industrial capability in the future.” 
The interview participants for the F-X and WLR-X programs expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of cost reductions (see Table 11), stating that “if the 
ROK military only tries to cut down the size of a program in order to reduce the contract 
price, this would be contrary to the the correct procurement of efficiency in the long run.” 
The interviewees for the E-X program also expressed a low level of consideration of 
offset valuation (see Table 11). The case of the E-X program for the Boeing E-737, 
Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) was first introduced in the ROK military 
as a reason for building self-defense in the process of the transfer of wartime operational 
control to the ROK in 2012, and less focused upon offset valuation such as contributing 
to domestic R&D and obtaining key technology. 
In ROK military offset valuation, there are six different types of offset programs. 
It is important to keep in mind the various types of defense offset programs when the 
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ROK military purchases foreign weapon systems. Figure 7 displays six different types of 
offset programs (the DISAM journal, December 2007).  
Offset
Compensation Counter Purchase Barter
Switch Trading
Co-Production Licensed Production
Subcontractor
Production
Overseas
Investment
Technology
Transfer Countertrade
 
Figure 7: Types of Defense Offset Programs 
 According to the definitions of offset programs below in Table 12, technology 
transfer distinguishes itself quite substantially among the processes of co-production, 
licensed production, overseas investment and subcontractor production. It is important at 
the national level to build up self-reliant defense strength. The ROK’s level of defense 
strength is largely determined by the rate of technological innovation. This rate of 
innovation is determined by the amount of Research and Development (R&D) that is 
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invested to create new technology and the capacity to pool and transfer technical 
resources. 
Table 12: Definitions of Defense Offset Program 
Types of Offset Definition 
Technology 
Transfer 
Occurs as a result of an offset agreement that may take the form 
of research and development conducted in the buyer country, 
technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or a joint venture 
in the foreign country, or other activities under direct 
commercial arrangement between exporting manufacturer and 
the buyer entity 
Co-production 
Based on the government-to-government contract, either 
importing governments or commercial firms acquire relevant 
technology data and information in order to produce either the 
finished weaponry or component parts abroad.  
Licensed 
Production 
Based on the technology data from the firm-to-firm or the firm-
to-government direct contract, the exporting manufacturer’s 
weapons or parts of there are produced in the buyer’s country 
Subcontractor 
Production 
The subcontractor produces component parts according to the 
direct contract between export manufacturers and foreign 
subcontractors, not necessarily involving the licensed production 
or technology transfer 
Overseas 
Investment 
Investment arising from an offset agreement, taking the form of 
capital investment to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint 
venture in the foreign country  
Source: The Management of Security Assistance, 2003: 487-511 
Technology transfer contains three types of technology, which is research and 
development (R&D), manufacturing, and depot level maintenance (DAPA regulation, 
2006). Among these types, this research found that R&D is a crucial part of the 
technology transfer in all of the programs (see Table 13). 
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Table 13: Offset Valuation related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Contributory effects on R&D x  x x x x 5
Building up indigenous technology for exports x      1
Degree of the offset technology transfer x x x x x x 6
Cost reductions   x x   2
 
As you can see in Table 13, the ROK military is highly interested in a technology 
transfer rather than cost reductions because the ROK military is seeking to strengthen the 
capabilities of its indigenous industry for defense reform 2020. From the ROK’s point of 
view, as a result of obtaining technology transfer, the ROK military could reduce costs 
over the long run and build up its own national defense capability. The interviewee for 
the KDX Goal Keeper program conveyed, “therefore, offset valuation was more 
important and considered than the contract price in the long run point of view.” 
As the DAPA regulation , the policy concerning offset programs include greater 
than $10M projects of foreign defense acquisition, and in this case, the ROK government 
announced a policy for acquisitions in which the minimum requirement is of 30 percent 
offset of the value of the amount in all defense acquisition contract. However, it is hard to 
practically estimate the offset valuation in monetary value early in a program because the 
ROK does not have an appropriate measurement tool and there is no common model that 
applies to many other importing countries. One interviewee for the E-X program 
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expressed, “this problem is going to be an obstacle to getting offset satisfaction from the 
selling countries.”  
In conclusion, most respondents in this research expressed that offset valuation 
will enhance the ROK’s technical and manufacturing potential and help to increase 
investments in domestic R&D and depot maintenance. They stated, “the pursuit of offset 
valuation will be beneficial to both the ROK military industry and foreign collaborators 
as a win-win strategy.” 
 
3. Mission performance capability 
Mission performance capability can be attained by incorporating the desirable 
efficiencies and components of existing successful technology for multi-mission capable 
weapon systems. The ROK military has declared its plan reforming the defense structure 
for preparation of cooperative self-reliant defense by 2020. This vision requires 
appropriate integration of technology as part of the solution that will close gaps in 
maximum mission performance. Table 14 shows the influences of mission performance 
capability over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions 
below) that support the factors in detail. 
3-1. Satisfaction of the ROK military & the degree of ROC 
3-2. Satisfaction of the mission performance capability compared with 
competitor nations 
3-3. Standard of improved capability compared with existing weapon systems 
& interoperability with related weapon systems 
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Table 14: The Influence of mission performance capability on Contracts 
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Performance 7 7 5 6 6 7 6.3 7 7 6 7 7 7 6.8 6.58 
Sub-Question 3-1 7 7 6 7 5 7 6.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.0 6.75 
Sub-Question 3-2 1 3 4 5 6 7 4.3 7 4 6 6 7 5 5.8 5.08 
Sub-Question 3-3 7 5 7 5 5 7 6.0 7 7 6 6 7 5 6.3 6.17 
 
 Mission performance capability is the highest priority among the factors (see 
Table 2 in Appendix 4). This factor is defined as a requirement for national defense and 
military strategy through its operational capability. As you can see in Table 14, some 
participants for the F-X, E-X and WLR-X programs expressed, “mission performance 
capability is a necessary factor to consider in judging whether a product could satisfy the 
ROK’s required operational capability (ROC), but it is not a factor to compare with the 
other competitor nation’s products.” In the early stage of each program, all involved 
programs usually rely on the historical data provided by the participating nations in order 
to compare the competitor nation’s products. However, the participants for the E-X 
program stated that there were not enough detailed data for comparison with other 
countries’ product capability.  
In conclusion, a consistently high level of consideration of mission performance 
capability was a core value among all factors. That is, this factor is essential when the 
ROK military makes decisions in the procurement of foreign countries’ defense weapon 
 55 
system. As stated by the interviewee for the F-X program, “mission performance 
capability is a basic factor to determine the completion of the program.” 
 
Table 15: Mission performance capability related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Satisfaction of the ROK military ROC x x x x x x 6
Performance compared with competitor   x  x x 3
Interoperability with related weapon systems x x x x   4
 
Most respondents acknowledged that while mission performance capability is the 
final goal that must be accomplished through the required operational capability, it can be 
difficult to meet this goal while considering offset valuation, defense budget levels, 
interoperability, and integrated logistics support. The greatest interest, as agreed upon by 
all interviewees, is the satisfaction of the ROK military ROC (see Table 15). It came 
from comments offered by an Air Force representative for the E-X program who 
suggested, “recently, the two biggest enablers for the contract are to accomplish 
satisfaction of the ROK military ROC and to offer offset valuation with a reasonable 
price.” 
In conclusion, the high level of mission performance capability is a crucial part of 
a successful contract for all programs. All representatives of each program repeatedly 
emphasized that “in the demonstration and validation phase of this factor, the ROK 
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military should not accept a contract unless the seller demonstrates that the desired 
technology actually worked.” The demonstration should prove that the weapon’s 
performance satisfies the ROC requirement to assess future capabilities in order to 
identify the specific measures that are needed. This research recognized that “the mission 
performance capability can be only achieved by numerous demonstrations and practical 
tests prohibiting unproven technology from other countries’ defense weapon articles.”  
A challenge of solving these assignments that was pointed out by several 
respondents was that the ROK military should equip more military installation and 
research complexes for acquiring product quality and validation. Some programs have 
been widely viewed as being very successful in providing improved weapon system 
performance, because the product has satisfied the ROK’s military expectations through 
numerous inspections in a well equipped research institute.  
 
4. Integrated Logistics Support 
The integrated logistics support is responsible for sustaining weapon systems 
readiness and managing a large part of the military’s investment in defense weapon’s 
capacity as integrator of weapon systems. Table 16 shows the influences of integrated 
logistics support over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-
Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
4-1. Convenience of procurement & follow-up support 
4-2. Level of infrastructure for operational maintenance 
4-3. Guarantee of most efficient capacity 
4-4. Effectiveness of time savings and cost reductions 
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Table 16: The Influence of Integrated Logistics Support on Contracts 
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ILS 4 7 6 7 6 5 5.8 7 7 7 7 5 6 6.5 6.17 
Sub-Question 4-1 4 7 6 6 7 5 5.8 7 7 7 7 5 6 6.5 6.17 
Sub-Question 4-2 4 7 5 6 6 5 5.5 2 4 7 7 5 5 5.0 5.25 
Sub-Question 4-3 4 7 6 7 6 5 5.8 7 5 7 7 5 6 6.2 6.00 
Sub-Question 4-4 4 5 6 7 7 5 5.7 7 4 4 6 5 7 5.5 5.58 
 
In most programs, this factor seemed to be a significant issue, even though this 
factor has less priority than interoperability and offset valuation. This factor enables the 
ROK military not only to guarantee great performance but also to achieve cost reductions 
and time saving during defense system’s lifecycle. Comparing U.S. and other countries’ 
programs, the integrated logistics support were graded a higher score to the interviewees 
for other countries’ programs (see Table 16). The interviewee for the WLR-X program 
commented that there were many difficulties in terms of previous equipment’s (AN/TPQ-
37, U.S.) integrated logistics support. In these results, they had chosen another country’s 
article, the Arthur from Sweden, because this country guaranteed much integrated 
logistics support with offset valuation and a cheaper price, including the guarantee of 
logistics supports.  
Relatively, the other countries were given a lower score than the U.S. in the level 
of infrastructure for operational maintenance (see Table 16), but the other sub-questions’ 
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scores were higher than those of the U.S. programs. This indicates that other countries are 
more flexible in addressing the ROK’s requests in terms of integrated logistics support. 
Table 17: Integrated Logistics Support Process Elements  
ILS Elements 
1. Maintenance Planning 
2. Maintenance Support Facilities 
3. Direct-work Maintenance Staffing 
4. Supply Support 
5. Support Equipment 
6. Training, Training Support, and Personnel Skills 
7. Technical Data 
8. Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
9. Computer Resources Support 
 
As the Integrated Logistics Support Process Manual explains (ILSPM, 2007: 5), 
the ILS process begins during mission analysis and continues throughout the lifecycle of 
a product or service. Table 17 identifies the ILS elements (ILSPM, 2007: 8). It progresses 
from analysis and planning during mission and investment analysis to acquisition during 
solution implementation to steady-state operations during in-service management. ILS 
planning is adjusted to ensure services continue to be supported in a cost-effective 
manner. 
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Table 18: Integrated Logistics Support related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Convenience of the follow-up support x x  x x  4
Level of operational maintenance x x x  x x 5
Guarantee of most efficient capacity x x  x   3
Effectiveness of time saving and cost reductions  x x x x x 5
 
As you can see in Table 18, of the twelve individuals who were asked about this 
factor, ten participants indicated that through integrated logistics support, the ROK 
military could accomplish certain cost reductions and could minimize operating costs that 
would benefit the long term relationship with the selling countries. Putting all 
considerations together in Table 18, the level of operational maintenance and guarantee 
of most efficient capacity are a benefit to the U.S. weapon industry, but other countries 
can take advantage of the effectiveness of cost reduction in the ROK’s defense weapon 
negotiation. 
There are other aspects to consider as well. One interviewee for the F-X program 
insisted that, although this factor seems to be considered an important factor in the early 
phases of a program, it is not considered highly in the process of a contract until the 
contract is accepted because the real effectiveness would come out after fnalizing a 
contract. Therefore, he suggested that the ROK military should consider this factor more 
seriously in the early stage of every contract so that the ROK could protect itself from 
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excessive lifecycle costs. Most of the interviewees, especially interviewees for the KDX I 
and KDX II programs, mentioned that the most important thing is to guarantee the 
mission performance capability. In order to achieve this capability, the ROK military has 
to require a timely deployment and durability. These factors can only be achieved 
through the integrated logistics support. 
 
5. Lifecycle 
The lifecycle management of a weapon system ensures its reliability, supportability, 
and total ownership cost. Therefore, many respondents felt that lifecycle is a part of the 
integrated logistics management system. Table 19 shows exhibits the influences of 
lifecycle over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions 
below) that support the factors in detail. 
5-1. Minimize the cost of lifecycle 
5-2. Systemize human resources management 
5-3. Systemize operational management 
Table 19: The Influence of Lifecycle on Contracts 
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Table 20: Lifecycle related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Minimize the cost of lifecycle x x x x x x 6
Systemize operational management  x  x x  3
 
In all programs, minimizing the lifecycle cost seemed to be a critical issue (see 
Table 20). The focus of this factor is minimizing the lifecycle costs. There are multiple 
points to be considered that minimize the lifecycle costs such as procurement cost, 
inventory cost, and disposal cost. The respondents for the WLR-X program mentioned 
that they added a new contract clause for the first time in the defense improvement 
program in order to curb wasting operational management budgets post contract award. 
Actually, there was evidence to show that many sellers try to expand their contract profit 
by supplying higher priced weapon parts during the lifecycle, resulting in wasting of 
money in the contract. Especially, in case of a foreign weapon purchase, there were many 
case of wasting money on the operational management. For these reasons, the 
interviewees for the E-X program were introduced to the Airborne Early Warning & 
Control Support Facility (AEW&CSF) in order to support the systemization of 
operational management.  
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6. Timely Deployment 
A simple definition of deployment is the placing of a new weapon system into the 
hands of a prepared user. Therefore, the timely deployment should be considered as an 
element for attaining an advantage relative to other countries in a critical situation. Table 
21 shows the influences of timely deployment over the programs and identifies the 
investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
6-1. Appropriate time-period from contract to disposition 
6-2. Possibility of eliminating the war potential vacuum 
6-3. Achievement of the comparative advantage of a fully operational system 
Table 21: The Influence of Timely Deployment on Contracts 
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Deployment Time 7 5 6 7 6 5 6.0 6 7 5 6 3 4 5.2 5.58 
Sub-Question 6-1 7 5 6 7 5 5 5.8 1 7 7 7 3 4 4.8 5.33 
Sub-Question 6-2 7 5 6 7 6 4 5.8 7 6 4 7 2 4 5.0 5.42 
Sub-Question 6-3 7 5 6 7 7 5 6.2 3 6 6 7 3 4 4.8 5.50 
 
Even though this factor has less priority than interoperability and offset valuation, 
this factor also seemed to be a significant issue in most programs. Comparing U.S. and 
other countries programs, the respondents for U.S. programs graded a higher score in 
deployment time (see Table 21). This is because timely deployment is one of most 
heavily weighed factors and a necessary condition to ROC satisfaction in the early stage 
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of contract process. If this factor is not satisfied for the ROC at the starting point, the 
ROK defense acquisition program should not be awarded any kind of weapon systems 
regardless of its mission performance capability. 
Although the majority of interviewees agreed that this factor should be 
accomplished to eliminate the war potential vacuum and attain of the comparative 
advantage of a timely operational system, it would be difficult to achieve and it often 
creates public criticism. Especially, military commentators denounce defense contractors 
for neglect of duty. For instance, in case of the F-X program, there existed much negative 
public opinion that the ROK military should have chosen Lockheed Martin F-35 
Lightning, the product of the joint strike fighter program or another country’s aircraft, 
such as France’s Rafale or Russia’s Sukhoi because of the problems with performance 
and price. However, the participants for the F-X program recognized that the ROK 
military would have to wait until 2014 to deploy the F-35 joint strike fighter. It is too late 
to attain a timely deployment whenever the ROK considers the transfer of wartime 
OPCON in 2012. For this reason, even if U.S. Air Force does not purchase F-15 anymore, 
the ROK Air Force had chosen the F-15K, the next term mainstay of air defense. 
 
7. Depot Maintenance 
Depot maintenance is the act of repair, overhaul, upgrade or rebuild of weapons 
systems, support equipment, component parts, and embedded operating software 
programs when the level of effort required to meet specified conditions exceeds the 
capabilities of lower level maintenance activities by improving materiel reliability and 
availability (army posture statement, 2008). Table 22 shows the influences of depot 
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maintenance over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-
Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
7-1. Achieve efficiency through Depot maintenance 
7-2. Convenience of maintenance & Capability of maintenance 
7-3. Convenience of acquiring extra equipment & technical training 
Table 22: The Influence of Depot Maintenance on Contracts 
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Depot Maintenance 4 4 6 4 5 3 4.3 6 4 4 6 3 6 4.8 4.58 
Sub-Question 7-1 4 4 6 4 4 3 4.2 1 3 4 7 3 6 4.0 4.08 
Sub-Question 7-2 4 5 6 4 5 3 4.5 7 4 4 7 3 6 5.2 4.83 
Sub-Question 7-3 4 4 6 4 6 3 4.5 6 3 4 6 3 6 4.7 4.58 
 
Multiple interview participants agreed that depot maintenance is a part of the 
integrated logistics management system. The greatest interest in this factor was to focus 
on aspects of cost and effect. One participant of the WLR-X programs gave a lower score 
to the establishment of depot maintenance (see table 22). He iterated the point that the 
ROK military forced contractors to secure the capability of depot maintenance by taking 
full advantage of other factors from offset valuation and integrated logistics support. For 
these reasons, Air Force representatives stated that there is no need to establish depot 
maintenance whenever the ROK purchase the defense weapon systems. 
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Table 23: Depot Maintenance related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Existence of depot maintenance     x  1
Efficiency of maintenance through outsourcing x x x x x x 6
Capability of technical training  x  x x  3
Convenience of acquiring component parts x x x x x x 6
 
As you can see in Table 23, two things that are more considered is to outsource 
maintenance system in order to save money as part of the offset negotiations and secure 
sub component parts readily. Outsourcing is the best way to invest defense budgets to 
build up national defense strength in terms of cost effectiveness. The interviewee for the 
KDX-II Goalkeeper commented that the previous established depot maintenance in 
Korea could not have the capability for repairing/upgrading the main system because the 
contract could not transfer core technologies from the buyer at the time. This situation 
many times resulted in the main system’s having to place an urgent order, and to depend 
upon the buyer’s depot maintenance system. Therefore, the outsourcing to private sector 
is likely to be beneficial for both the ROK military and domestic weapon companies in 
terms of cost saving. Outsourcing also enables the ROK military to attain convenience in 
acquiring component parts. 
There are other aspects to consider as well. The interviewee for the F-X program 
insisted that, although this factor seems to be considered as an important factor in the 
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early stages of the program, the actual effectiveness is proved after a contract is awarded 
so that this factor is not given too much importance at the moment of the conclusion of 
the contract. Other interviewee for the WLR-X program commented that recently the 
ROK military could overcome the disadvantages of depot maintenance through offset 
negotiations. 
Although it is still reasonable for the ROK military to consider depot maintenance 
as an important factor, the ROK military is trying to outsource to domestic weapons 
companies in order to reduce operating maintenance price. That is, ROK military 
operating costs can be minimized through the pooling of common resources such as 
technical training, maintenance facilities and support equipment. 
 
8. National Security 
National security refers to the requirement to maintain the nation-state through the 
use of military and political power. South Korea is a very dangerous region of the world, 
particularly with regard to North Korea. Table 24 shows the influences of national 
security over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions 
below) that support the factors in detail. 
8-1. Maintenance of peace on the Korea Peninsula 
8-2. Realization of the strategic policy toward North Korea 
8-3. Developing strategic military power through military transformation 
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Table 24: The Influence of National Security on Contracts 
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National Security 5 5 2 4 3 3 3.7 4 7 4 4 3 4 4.3 4.00 
Sub-Question 8-1 5 5 2 3 3 3 3.5 4 7 4 5 3 4 4.5 4.00 
Sub-Question 8-2 5 5 2 5 4 3 4.0 4 6 4 5 3 3 4.2 4.08 
Sub-Question 8-3 5 7 2 4 3 3 4.0 4 6 7 5 3 5 5.0 4.50 
 
 There is no great difference among the programs for national security, and most 
respondents did not give a high score to national security (see Table 24). Several 
respondents noted that this factor was managed by headquarters ROK Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, a group of chiefs from each major branch of the armed services for attaining 
military strategies. For both U.S. and Non-U.S. programs, this factor was not a main 
element considered in the contract process, but a precondition for deciding on mission 
performance capability before contract process. The respondents for the E-X program 
noted that this was a necessary condition in an acquiring phase, not in contract process. 
However, they believed that national security was considered indirectly. For instance, this 
factor was a prior condition that shapes a defense weapon contract. 
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Table 25: National Security related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula x   x   2
Realization of the strategic N. Korea policy  x x  x   3
Making the strategic military transformation x x x x x  5
 
The most interesting finding by multiple interview participants was that national 
security is ultimately one of the objectives of acquiring a defense weapon system for the 
wartime OPCON 2012 and defense reform 2020 despite the belief that national security 
had little impact on each program’s decision making (see Table 25). 
This factor seems to be considered in the early phases as a political consideration, but 
not considered in the process of each contract. One interviewee for the E-X program 
stated that in processing the defense weapon systems, price and mission performance 
capability had a much greater impact on contract decisions than national security. The 
Navy interviewee for the KDX-II Goalkeeper program expressed that the KDX-II 
goalkeeper is just an individual weapon system, not a strategic war vessel like a naval 
warship, so that National security was not considered as much higher than other factors in 
terms of a significant issue in the process. The participants for the KDX I program 
commented that this factor depends on the security environment of the Korean peninsula 
including U.S.-ROK military relationships and North Korean provocation. 
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9. U.S.-ROK Alliance 
The U.S.-ROK alliance, a pillar of East Asia security for more than 50 years, is still 
strong on the Korean Peninsula. The influence of this relationship is felt in many foreign 
affairs. Therefore, there is a consistent perception that the U.S.-ROK military partnership 
will directly influence the decision making in purchasing defense articles from foreign 
countries. Table 26 shows the influences of U.S.-ROK alliance over the programs and 
identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors 
in detail. 
9-1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula & Obstruct North Korean 
provocations 
9-2. Intensification of the U.S.-ROK mutual assistance structure 
9-3. Building up strategic alliance 
Table 26: The Influence of U.S.-ROK Alliance on Contracts 
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U.S-ROK Alliance 5 1 6 4 4 5 4.2 4 3 4 4 3 4 3.7 3.92 
Sub-Question 9-1 5 1 7 4 5 5 4.5 5 3 4 5 3 4 4.0 4.25 
Sub-Question 9-2 5 1 6 4 3 5 4.0 4 3 4 4 3 4 3.7 3.83 
Sub-Question 9-3 5 1 6 4 4 5 4.2 4 3 4 4 3 4 3.7 3.92 
 
 Comparing U.S. and Non-U.S. programs (see Table 26); the participants for U.S. 
programs gave a little more score to the U.S.-ROK alliance. This is a natural consequence 
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of the fact that the U.S. military is still stationed on the Korean peninsula, and the ROK 
military has acquired U.S. defense weapon systems for over fifty years. However, this 
result is not relative to the perception that the U.S.-ROK military partnership will directly 
influence the decision making in purchasing defense articles. It comes from several other 
reasons: 
1. Interoperability for integrated operation during the combined exercises 
2. Integrated Logistics Support for convenience of procurement / follow-up support 
3. Timely deployment for achievement of the comparative advantage of time period 
4. Depot Maintenance for convenience of technical training 
As mentioned earlier, the ROK military considers these factors very highly in the process 
of decision making, and these four factors relatively favor to U.S. weapon systems. For 
these reasons, the ROK has acquired the U.S. defense articles. Therefore, there was little 
evidence to suggest that, most respondents believed that, the U.S.-ROK partnership had 
much impact on contract decisions. The Army interviewee stated “it usually depends on 
the size of a program.” In the case of the small WLR-X Army program, this program was 
designed to reduce a product price and compete with other countries for a program 
contract in its early phases, because the ROK military had used U.S. articles, the 
AN/TPQ-36 and the AN/TPQ-37, during 30 years without change. Therefore, the ROK 
military suggested that the two enablers for contract accomplishment should be a lower 
price and mission performance capability. But, as mentioned earlier, the radar system as 
an independent unit just needs to transmit its signal to a higher command only so that the 
 72 
ROK military could achieve the mission performance capability from the Arthur made by 
Sweden with a lower price. 
 
Table 27: U.S.-ROK Alliance related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  x x x x  4
Intensification of the U.S-ROK mutual assistance  x     1
Political consideration and understanding x x x   x 4
 
It is interesting to note that while most participants in this study believed that the 
U.S.-ROK alliance was an influential factor that should be considered, most of 
interviewees did not consider this factor much in the process of decision making. As you 
can see in Table 27, the contract awards were influenced in specific situations by events 
or change of the times such as North Korea’s provocation and the change of government. 
For instance, the interviewee for the KDX-II conveyed that after the KDX-I contract was 
signed between the ROK military and Italy, the U.S. complained and pointed out many 
problems such as the possible difficulties with integrated operations. At the same time, 
there were also some issues that came up like the IMF (International Monetary Fund), 
which is an economic crisis, and the Naval battle of the Yun-Pyung when North Korea 
invaded South Korea’s Northern Limit Line (NLL). For these reasons, the ROK military 
chose U.S. warship guns as the next defense weapon system for KDX II program. 
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10. Northeast Asia Strategy 
The strategic environment of the Northeast Asian region is undergoing rapid change. 
China and Russia are strengthening their strategic ties. Faced with the threat of North 
Korean missiles and nuclear weapons as well as China’s growing power, Japan appears to 
be speeding up its own military buildup and strengthening military alliances. For these 
reasons, the ROK military should consider these situations heavily in building up a self-
defense strength. Table 28 shows the influences of Northeast Asia strategy over the 
programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that 
support the factors in detail. 
10-1. Maintenance of the military power balance with bordering states 
10-2. Systematization of northeast Asian multi-national security cooperation 
10-3. Maintenance of cooperative relationships with bordering states based on 
U.S.-ROK Alliance 
Table 28: The Influence of Northeast Asia Strategy on Contracts 
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Northeast Asia Strategy 5 5 2 3 3 4 3.7 4 3 4 4 3 3 3.5 3.58 
Sub-Question 10-1 5 5 2 2 3 5 3.7 4 3 6 5 3 3 4.0 3.83 
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Sub-Question 10-3 5 5 2 4 3 3 3.7 4 3 3 4 3 3 3.3 3.50 
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Comparing U.S. and Other countries programs, most respondents did not give a 
high score to the Northeast Asia strategy (see Table 28). Multiple interview participants 
agreed that the Northeast Asia strategy is a part of national security. In the early phases of 
each program, both the ROK military and each program’s participants considered various 
risks for strategic purposes. They conclude that one of the main risks in the future would 
be working out of the context of the Northeast Asia strategy. But, in most programs, the 
Northeast Asia strategy did not seem to be a significant issue, sometimes having no 
significance at all, because the ROK was more focused on getting better capability and 
lower prices through competition with foreign countries. One respondent for the F-X 
program also commented that the Northeast Asia Strategy is a prior condition for 
achieving the mission performance capability and the national security. 
 
Table 29: Northeast Asia Strategy related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Military strength balance with bordering states x  x  x  3
Multi-national security cooperation x    x  2
Political & Strategic viewpoint x x x  x x 5
 
As you can see in Table 29, the political philosophy with the change of the times 
highly influences this factor in specific situations like the preceding factor. While the 
Northeast Asia strategy is important from the political and strategic point of view, in the 
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contract process, this factor was not considered highly. Comparatively, in the case of 
Army contract, the interviewees for the WLR-X program remarked that the Army didn’t 
consider this factor. In Army programs, the participants were more focused on North 
Korea’s provocation than the Northeast Asia strategy. 
Most Army weapon systems are produced by domestic companies, but at that time, 
the ROK military did not have capability to build a locating radar warning receiver. 
Therefore, they decided to purchase this system from foreign countries. The Army 
contractors for the WLR-X program were more concerned with lower price and offset 
value than with the Northeast Asia strategy, which was not considered in the contract 
process. As a result, the Arthur made by Sweden was selected. 
 
11. Defense Budget Levels 
South Korea will sharply increase its military spending in the next twelve years (by 
2020) as an effort to transform its military into a more agile, high-tech force equipped 
with sophisticated weapons. Therefore, the ROK military defense budget will be 
increased to 3.5% of the total gross domestic product by 2020 (2.9% in 2008). Table 30 
shows the influences of defense budget levels over the programs and identifies the 
investigative questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
11-1. Pertinence of the business size 
11-2. Budgetary allocations considering lifecycle costs 
11-3. Effort for the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012 
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Table 30: The Influence of Defense Budget Levels on Contracts 
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Sub-Question 11-1 3 5 6 6 5 3 4.7 6 6 7 6 3 4 5.3 5.00 
Sub-Question 11-2 1 5 6 6 5 3 4.3 6 5 7 6 3 5 5.3 4.83 
Sub-Question 11-3 5 5 7 6 5 3 5.2 4 4 4 5 3 3 3.8 4.50 
 
 Most of the programs recognized that defense acquisition budgeting was 
considered highly in terms of deciding a program size (see Table 30). The participants 
pointed out current defense acquisition budgeting system’s problems. The ROK military 
contractors want the flexibility to make changes within the current five year national 
budget plan.  
 
Figure 9: Defense Acquisition Budgeting Procedure  
(DAPA Online official homepage, http://www.dapa.go.kr/eng). 
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A current budget procedure is limited by a mid-term defense planning process in 
compliance with the five year national budget plan (see Figure 9). A mid-term defense 
plan is developed in line with the five year national budget plan. Therefore, every 
program size is restricted by the given defense budget plan, usually making a program 
size smaller than it was in the original plan. For instance, in the F-X program, the ROK 
Air Force planned to introduce 120 Boeing F-15Ks as a target number for replacing its 
aging fleet of F-4s and F-5s within the original plan. However, they had to changed their 
first plan into introducing 40 units by 2012 because of budget constraints. One of 
interviewees for the ROK defense acquisition program expressed that “this factor will be 
considered as key factor in the process of each program after changing the current 
budgetary system, because the majority of the participants are limited by the uncertainty 
of each program’s budget over program periods that would generally be considered long-
term contract periods.” The bottom line is that, the ROK military needs to consider 
changing the current defense budget regulation in order to meet U.S. export budget policy 
and other countries’ budget policies. 
Table 31: Defense Budget Levels related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Pertinence of the program size  x  x x  3
Budgetary allocations considering lifecycle  x x x x  4
Effort for the transfer wartime OPCON in 2012 x x     2
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In most programs, even respondents recognized that defense acquisition 
budgeting was considered highly in terms of deciding a program size, but defense budget 
levels did not seem to be as significant issue as was the Northeast Asia strategy. The 
participants recommended that current defense acquisition budgeting system should be 
considered corresponding to the selling countries’ budgetary system. Several respondents 
acknowledged that this factor has no power to influence each program, because they only 
consider this factor as a boundary of given budget levels. Interview participants generally 
assume that the budget level is approved by the ROK congress, even if they considered it 
personally as an important factor. One interviewee for the E-X program noted that this 
factor should be considered in the national interest rather than in the viewpoint of a 
specific program. Therefore, the defense budget level has been growing since 2006 
because the wartime OPCON issue for a self-defense operation came out after late 2006. 
This factor will be considered much more in the future. 
 
12. ROK Political Environment 
The ROK political environment could influence on the ROK administration’s policy 
and foreign policy assessing security risks. It allows easy comparison of threats to ROK 
military’s current operations and future plans. The ROK military could gain valuable 
insights through the political environment. Table 32 shows the influences of political 
environment over the programs and identifies the investigative questions (see Sub-
Questions below) that support the factors in detail. 
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12-1. Recognition of U.S.-ROK Alliance 
12-2. Direction of the government policy toward North Korea 
12-3. Effort to move toward peaceful unification 
Table 32: The Influence of ROK Political Environment on Contracts 
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ROK Political Issue 5 5 2 3 3 5 3.8 4 4 5 4 3 3 3.8 3.83 
Sub-Question 12-1 5 5 2 3 3 5 3.8 4 3 4 4 3 3 3.5 3.67 
Sub-Question 12-2 5 5 2 4 3 5 4.0 4 4 6 5 3 3 4.3 4.17 
Sub-Question 12-3 5 5 2 3 3 4 3.7 4 3 4 5 3 3 3.7 3.67 
 
 Comparing U.S. and Non-U.S. programs through Table 32, there is no difference 
in factor’s average. Neither U.S. nor Non-U.S. program’s interviewees gave high grade to 
the political environment factor. They stated that the ROK’s political environment did not 
have much impact on the contract process. Comparatively, the interviewees for the F-X 
program graded this higher than did those from the other programs. They stated that 
“even though this factor was not a main consideration, and this was one of the political 
elements, the F-X program contractor considered this factor more in the contract process 
because the F-X program was one of a national big business.” In other words, ROK 
political environment is influenced by the size of a business program. For instance, in the 
case of the F-X program, the F-15K, a mainstay of the country’s air defense, was a big 
project to eliminate the potential security vacuum. This program will become a crucial 
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national defense asset as the ROK military prepares to be taken over wartime operational 
control of its armed forces by U.S. on April 2012. It will intensify precision strike 
capabilities of the ROK Air Force, replacing its aging fleet of F-4s and F-5s. 
 
Table 33: ROK Political Environment related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Consideration of U.S.-ROK alliance x  x    2
Direction of the government political issue x x x x x x 6
Effort to move toward peaceful unification       0
 
In most programs, the ROK political environment was not be considered as a 
significant issue for interviewees as for the Northeast Asia strategy, because a political 
environment is outside the scope of their authority, and this factor can be considered as a 
nationally undertaken project. In addition, this factor depends on the domestic 
environment of Korean peninsula such as government policy and relationship of alliance 
with around countries (see Table 33). Therefore, the interviewee for the F-X program 
pointed out that the ROK political environment cannot be the main factor for 
consideration in the process of introducing foreign defense system but can be a factor for 
reflecting domestic political considerations. The other interviewee for the KDX-II 
Warship guns program commented that this factor is influenced by the current 
government policy. That is, it depends on a specific government at a certain time. 
 81 
 
13. Trends in Public Opinion 
Public opinion is the distribution of opinions and attitudes held by the public by 
measuring common opinions at the individual level and aggregating them. It is also 
useful to know how strongly the public holds particular opinions and the direction those 
opinions seem to be moving. The role of public opinion in a representative democracy is 
highly important. Table 34 shows the influences of public opinion over the programs and 
identifies the supplementary questions (see Sub-Questions below) that support the factors 
in detail. 
13-1. Achievement of positive public opinion through the press 
13-2. Reflection of transparency & fairness 
13-3. Creation of a national consensus 
Table 34: The Influence of Trends in Public Opinion on Contracts 
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Public Opinion 2 1 6 6 4 3 3.7 4 6 4 5 4 3 4.3 4.00 
Sub-Question 13-1 2 1 6 6 3 2 3.3 2 4 4 5 2 3 3.3 3.33 
Sub-Question 13-2 2 1 7 7 4 4 4.2 7 6 7 5 4 4 5.5 4.83 
Sub-Question 13-3 2 1 6 6 4 3 3.7 4 5 4 5 3 3 4.0 3.83 
 
 Table 34 shows the interviewees think that the reflection of transparency is one of 
most important sub-factors in considering the public opinion. However, the interviewee 
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for the F-X program gave a low score to this factor. Interviewees expressed the opinion 
that “a contract award was determined by contractors during the process of a program, 
and we played a central role based on the defense acquisition regulations. Therefore we 
did not need to consider public opinion.” They remarked that public opinion is not 
subject to one of empirical main factors because of deficiencies in the historical data. 
 On the contrary, in case of the latest E-X program, the interviewees stated that a 
main contract award will be influenced by the effect of public opinion especially in the 
future, because much information is revealed in the middle of contract process and the 
government is following the trend of public opinion. That is, the public opinion would 
influence both the contractor and ROK military during contract period. 
 
Table 35: Trends in Public Opinion related Contract Decision Criteria 
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Reflection of transparency x x x x x x 6
Achievement of positive opinion  x  x   2
Creating a national consensus  x   x  2
 
Although most programs recognized that national public opinion was too 
important to ignore, this factor was not acknowledged as an effective component in the 
past contract process. Among the sub questions, every interviewee especially mentioned 
transparency and public reputation (see Table 35). They insisted that interviewees should 
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consider issues such as transparency that would help to earn another future program, 
because positive public opinion can be achieved by a program’s transparency at 
completion. It can make the people of a nation confident in every single defense weapon 
contract. 
The most notable program causing dissatisfaction in public opinion was the F-X 
program. For instance, one of interviewees for the F-X program disagreed with the fact 
that contractors should consider public opinions and create a positive atmosphere from 
the citizenry in the process of each program. He regarded transparency and public 
reputation as a factor to be presented to the public after contract is awarded. That is, the 
awarding of a contract, presentations on program accomplishment with transparency 
were more important than presenting incomplete information about their transparency 
process to get a positive public reputation during the process of each program. Many 
interviewees mentioned the fact that public opinion can be more influential in future 
programs The ROK military should prepare to create a regulation to reflect these trends, 
such as a survey of public opinion and committee meetings consisting of members who 
are interested in defense procurement. 
 
Summary 
This chapter discussed the research results within the framework of the 
investigative questions (see Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix 4). There were many 
aspects and recommendations to consider as pointed out by the interviewees throughout 
this research. These were founded solid evidence of how successful contract award are 
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evaluated. These opinions seem to represent what our acquisition needs are and should be. 
The next chapter examines what conclusions can be drawn from these findings in order to 
answer the research question, and discusses implications of the conclusions.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter four provided the results of interviews and analysis of the data that was 
gathered, and it detailed the pattern for the investigative questions which were combined 
and analyzed with tables and figures so that this study could discuss the issues that were 
most frequently raised by participants. 
This chapter summarizes the research effort. It will answer the research question 
and investigative questions, and discuss other relevant observations relating to this study. 
There was considerable acknowledgment from interviewees that several factors should be 
considered by the ROK military in order to acquire contract advantages whenever the 
ROK military procures defense articles. Additionally, this chapter continues with a 
discussion of factors that limit this research and recommendations for future research 
effort. The chapter concludes by summarizing the research. 
 
Research Objective 
The focus of this research was to address the question of how various factors can 
explain how main weapon programs achieve future defense articles while simultaneously 
building long-term indigenous industrial capability. 
The decision process considered various factors including: Interoperability, Offset 
valuation, Mission performance capability, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), Lifecycle, 
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Timely Deployment, Depot Maintenance, National Security, U.S.-ROK Alliance, 
Northeast Asia Strategy, Defense Budget Levels, ROK Political Environments and 
Trends in Public Opinion for explaining what the essential elements are in the process of 
ROK’s decision making.  
Through this study, the ROK military would rank the priorities in their selection 
process and diligently evaluate the relative advantages. The purpose of this chapter is not 
to promote one procurement method over another. In reality, what method is best for the 
ROK military depends on a number of factors. The purpose of this chapter is to look at 
the various factors that should be considered in making the FMS/DCS decision. By 
understanding these factors and applying them to the ROK military situation in the future, 
a better decision can be made regarding which method offers the best approach for a 
future acquisition program.  
 
Conclusions of the Research 
As discussed in Chapter one, this research determined, after a review of selected 
programs, that there are main factors to consider in deciding on a major defense weapon 
system. However, there are also sensitive, but significant differences. The results of this 
research seem to indicate that some of factors such as interoperability, offset valuation, 
and integrated logistics support should be considered more highly in the process of future 
programs. Consequently, this research has prioritized the factors that should be addressed 
in the process of ROK’s decision making (see Table 36).  
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Table 36: Factor Priority in the ROK’s Decision Making 
Factor Total Average Rank Group 
Mission performance capability  6.58  1  A 
Interoperability  6.25  2  A 
Integrated Logistics Support  6.17  3  A 
Offset Valuation  5.67  4  B 
Timely deployment  5.58  5  B 
Lifecycle  5.25  6  B 
Defense Budget Levels  5.17  7  B 
Depot Maintenance  4.58  8  C 
National Security  4.00  9 (tie)  D 
Trend of Public Opinion  4.00  9 (tie)  D 
U.S.‐ROK Alliance  3.92  11  D 
ROK Political Environment  3.83  12  D 
Northeast Asia Strategy  3.58  13  D 
 
An important lesson learned in this research was that some of the core factors 
(Group A) among the thirteen factors to be considered in foreign weapon procurement 
contracts highly motivate the military to build up defense strength (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 4). This research resulted in general conclusions from the outcome of 
interviews and recommends some considerations in future programs: 
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1. Purchasing weapon systems which satisfy the ROK military ROC on the basis of 
mission performance capability and interoperability. 
2. Reviewing the convenience of integrated logistics support, including depot 
maintenance. 
3. Evaluating & considering economical efficiency through offset valuation and 
lifecycle costs. 
 
To attain these effects, these core factors’ constraints must be clearly defined, and the 
ROK military needs to understand all of the constraints. To meet the constraint 
requirements in future Korean military acquisition programs, this research explains the 
prioritized factors especially Group A in order below. 
 
Mission Performance Capability 
Mission performance capability is the highest priority among the factors (see 
Table 36). In this research, a consistently high level of consideration was given to 
mission performance capability among all programs. That is, this factor is essential when 
the ROK military makes decisions in the procurement of foreign countries’ defense 
articles. Most respondents also acknowledged that mission performance capability is the 
final goal that must be accomplished through the end of the contract. That means, mission 
performance capability is a crucial part of successful contracts for all programs. Because 
every effort to attain offset valuation, interoperability and integrated logistics support is 
ultimately to guarantee the mission performance capability.  
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However, the ROK contractors must keep in mind that mission performance 
capability can only be achieved by numerous demonstrations and practical tests 
eliminating unproven technology in the demonstration and validation phase. In the early 
stage in each program, all involved programs also should try to find out ways to solve the 
data shortage from foreign countries in order to compare the competitor nation’s products 
more in detail. 
 
Interoperability 
 Interoperability is the second priority in Group A (see Table 36) and the ability of 
two or more defense weapons capable of executing basically the same functions or 
otherwise capable of supporting each other irrespective of the technical differences of 
between systems. This factor was mentioned repeatedly as a success factor for most of 
the programs. Most respondents believed that this factor had significant impact on 
contract decisions because the system which cannot operate with previous weapon 
systems could waste time, money and energy, and ensuring interoperability would 
enhance the ability among U.S. allies to increase mission effectiveness. Especially, the 
systematic connection with the existing systems is the biggest enabler towards 
accomplishing interoperability in the contract process. 
In the case of other countries, the ROK military could receive many advantages 
such as offset valuation, contract price, and the ROK military’s requirements from 
importing countries using strategy of weighing these factors against U.S products’ 
benefits in terms of interoperability. Because other countries’ contractors already 
 90 
recognize and take into consideration the environment by which the U.S. has achieved 
many benefits of interoperability from ROK, the ROK military could get more benefits 
and flexibility from other factors such as integrated logistics support, offset valuation and 
price. 
 
Integrated Logistics Support 
Integrated logistics support as a critical functional discipline factor which impacts 
on product structures as a support system for the full lifecycle and services is the third 
priority in Group A (see Table 36). Integrated logistics support enables not only to 
guarantee a great performance but also to achieve cost reductions and time saving. ILS 
processes and activities are to be undertaken during a product lifecycle and the 
acquisition management lifecycle. Most participants expressed that the ROK military 
could achieve certain cost reductions and could minimize operating costs that would 
benefit throughout long term relationships with the selling countries through this factor.  
Putting all considerations together, the level of operational maintenance and 
guarantee of most efficient capacity can be benefit of the U.S. weapon industry, but other 
countries can take advantage of the effectiveness of cost reduction in the ROK’s defense 
weapon negotiation. After all, the integrated logistics support could be responsible for 
sustaining weapon systems readiness and managing a large part of the military’s 
investment in defense weapon’s capacity as integrator of weapon systems. 
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Offset Valuation  
Technology valuation has been spurring increasingly growing attention since the 
beginning of the 1990’s. As distinct from the issue of technology assessment, technology 
valuation is an activity to review technology, industrialization, and market factors to gain 
intangible benefits. As mentioned earlier, no one denies that offset is a powerful factor, 
even though it is the fourth priority among the factors (see Table 36). In the research, 
however, offset valuation was confirmed as one of the most influential factors for the 
future. 
Recognizing the importance of defense offset programs, the purchasing countries 
have scarce means and poor models of estimating the defense offset value due to the lack 
of an objective and credible technology valuation model. Actually, the value is quite 
different from the cost itself. In the matter of defense offset estimation, as mentioned in 
chapter four, this factor is difficult to estimate as a value. From the buyer’s point of view, 
the value is greater because the offset program gives the ROK a chance to acquire 
intangible assets including technology, parts production opportunity and co-production. 
Therefore, the buyer continues to attempt to obtain advanced defense technology and 
other valuable opportunities by using offset programs. 
The ROK defense offset technology valuation is slightly different from the 
definition of technology valuation. It focuses on the valuation of defense technology from 
the offset contracts. It presents also the technical values in monetary terms and other 
considerations. Therefore, it creates an evaluation activity for defense technology itself to 
describe in monetary terms a review of its technical, economical, and defense strength 
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effects. For these reasons, the ROK military should develop a framework for evaluation 
of defense offset technology using the appropriate technology valuation approaches under 
the current situation. It is firmly believed that offset valuation could be a great 
contribution to meeting the objective of defense weapon procurement and should be a 
solid bridge to developing a win-win relationship/strategy between the buyer and the 
seller in the future. 
 
Limitations of the Research  
As discussed thoroughly in the previous chapters of this research, this study explained 
what factors had more impact on considering the purchase of military systems produced 
by foreign countries, and several investigative questions were answered in order to 
explain the research question. In these processes, this study discovered limitations with 
the defense acquisition process. The program participants believed the DAMR had 
significantly influenced each contract. They are faced with some challenges from the 
regulation. For instance, several interviewees mentioned repeatedly that the contract 
priority allowed by the DAMR was not on the mission performance capability but on 
contract price in the final phase. They acknowledged that if weapon system is satisfied 
the ROK’s ROC, the contract price would become the highest priority among all factors 
in the contract process. For these reasons, some of interviewees suggested that ROK must 
consider and manage the three elements of the defense acquisition. 
 
1. Defense weapon system in terms of monitoring and tracking 
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2. Contractor management providing feedback to guarantee risk, making organize 
cross-functional teams, providing an appropriate disciplines 
3. Deregulation/Reformation of the defense acquisition considering the world 
acquisition environment. 
 
In the case of the researcher, one should be aware that, although many limitations 
came out through this case study, there are three main limitations to the research. The 
first limitation was the lack of experience in acquisition and knowledge of the relative 
regulations. For instance, Defense Acquisition Management Regulation (DAMR) 
complicates the understanding in terms of the process and method of defense weapon 
procurement. The reason is that defense weapon systems’ definitions are complex, and 
acquisition processes and management are more complex. The researcher should be 
aware of not only how the factors relate to each program’s process but also how each 
factor relates to the other factors connected with the many practical experiences of the 
interviewees integrating their diverse opinions. However, understanding specific 
knowledge or background of Air Force and Navy contract processes was hard-not just 
because of communication challenges, but, more importantly, because the researcher 
didn’t have enough experience. 
The second limitation was the range of the interviewee’s point of view according 
to their position. This made the experts estimate each factor differently, and allowed the 
participants a greater possibility of misinterpretation. Although their different positions 
generally did not seem to be a significant issue on the data over all the programs, some of 
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the programs made it difficult to make generalizations that could be applied to these 
programs. For instance, the interviewees for the F-X program evaluated the 
interoperability factor much differently, because one man was a contract manager in 
charge of the F-X program, but the other was an assistant officer at that time. For these 
reasons, this study struggled with integrating interviewees’ opinions and finding the set 
pattern through the research. The different military positions seem to lead to differing 
philosophies about many factors. 
The last limitation was a time restriction with interviewees working for DAPA. 
As mentioned earlier in chapter two, this study focused on the identification of the factors. 
Therefore, the researcher tried to get respondents to participate in the telephone interview 
about each contract in order to identify a success factor with the interviewees, because 
each program studied was greatly dependent upon the responsiveness of the interviewees 
and their willingness to participate. Therefore, the researcher must capture the 
interviewee’s core explanation concentrating on “how” or “why”, and the interviewees 
must answer the researcher’s expectations about each factor. However, the researcher 
could not control the interviewees because of their schedule, rank, and interview time 
over the phone. The researcher usually was not satisfied with the interviewee’s final 
answers, because every interviewee was working for another contract, and some of them 
did not want to explain in detail. The time allotted was not sufficient to guarantee that the 
researcher fully understood each program’s information which interviewees had given 
over the phone. For these reasons, the researcher was subject to the pressure of interview 
conditions. 
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An additional limitation of this research was that the researcher only focused on 
the given factors during the telephone interviews. That is, interviewees replied to 
researcher’s interview questions focusing on “how” or “why”. Therefore, other factors or 
useful suggestions may be available which the research was unable to identify through 
the telephone interview. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research has identified how various factors can explain main weapon 
programs’ justification to achieve future weapon systems while simultaneously building 
long-term indigenous industrial capability. During the process of this research, the 
researcher identified many opportunities for further research that could apply to 
continuous improvement.  
Therefore, future research can focus on identifying shortfalls or drawbacks from 
the future programs related to factors that mentioned, because future program participants 
can expect to continue to face the challenge of these disadvantages such as offset 
estimation and improvement of performance. It also may be beneficial to compare this 
study’s results with the contract that was made after organizing DAPA focusing on 
efficiency. Another possible focus of future research is to explain only one factor or 
Group A in detail among the factors and programs already dealt with. For instance, the 
interoperability is the one of examples. How interoperability is achievable and affordable, 
and which factor in Group A is the best suited to the ROK military environment would 
make an excellent subject for research. 
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This research could provide the information required to enhance the ROK’s 
decision making in the future. This study also would enable the ROK contractor to 
provide criteria used to select core factors and useful information when they consider 
various factor to procure a large defense article.
 97 
 
Appendix 1.  Interview Questions 
 
번호 항 목 
 
① │---------------│⑦ 
Not at all Consider           Extremely Consider 
Cost & Technical Performance 
1 Interoperability(상호운용성) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 연합작전 시 통합운용 가능성(_____) 
9 Possibility of integrated operations during the combined exercises 
9 기존 무기체계와의 체계적 연계성(_____) 
9 Possibility of systematic connection with the existing weapon systems 
9 시스템 통합 서비스의 존재 및 상호운용을 위한 환경구축(_____) 
9 Existence of the system-integrated service & construction of the environment for 
interoperability 
 
이유(Why): 
 
 
2 Offset Valuation(절충교역) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 국내 연구개발에 기여효과(_____) 
9 Contributory effects on R&D 
9 향후 수출 증대 및 해외시장 개척을 위한 기술기반 구축(_____) 
9 Building up the foundation of technology for enlarging future exports 
9 절충교역의 충족도(국내 군수업체 참여, 핵심기술 획득 및 공동개발 등) (_____) 
9 Satisfaction of offset (i.e. join domestic weapons companies, obtain key technology, and 
co-development etc.) 
9 비용절감 효과(_____) 
9 Effectiveness of cost reductions 
 
이유(Why) 
 
 
3 Performance Capability(임무수행능력) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 소요군의 만족도 및 ROC 충족 정도(_____) 
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9 Satisfaction of the ROK military & degree of ROC 
9 경쟁사와의 비교 가치를 통한 임무수행 능력의 만족도(_____) 
9 Satisfaction of the mission performance capability compared with competitor nations 
9 무기체계 능력향상수준 및 관련 무기체계와의 상호운용능력(_____) 
9 Standard of improved capability compared with existing weapon systems & 
interoperability with related weapon systems 
 
이유(Why): 
Implementation & Management
4 Integrated Logistics Support(종합군수지원) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 획득 및 후속지원의 용이성(_____) 
9 Convenience of procurement & follow-up support 
9 운영유지를 위한 기반 정도(_____) 
9 Level of infrastructure for operational maintenance 
9 장비의 최대 성능발휘 보장(_____) 
9 Guarantee of most efficient capacity 
9 시간절약 및 비용절감 효과(_____) 
9 Effectiveness of time savings and cost reductions 
 
이유(Why): 
5 Lifecycle(수명주기) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 수명주기비용의 최소화(_____) 
9 Minimize the cost of lifecycle 
9 인력유지비의 시스템화(_____) 
9 Systemize human resources management 
9 운영유지의 체계화(_____) 
9 Systemize operational management 
 
이유(Why): 
6 Timely Deployment (전력화시기) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 계약~운용까지 운용시기의 적절성(_____) 
9 Appropriate time-period from contract to disposition 
9 전력공백 달성 가능성(_____) 
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9 Possibility of eliminating the war potential vacuum 
9 적기 전력화를 위한 비교 우위 달성(_____) 
9 Achievement of the comparative advantage of timely deployment 
 
이유(Why) 
 
 
7 Depot Maintenance(창정비) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 창정비를 통한 효과달성(시설, 기술) (_____) 
9 Achieve efficiency through Depot Maintenance 
9 정비능력 및 정비의 용이성(_____) 
9 Convenience of maintenance & Capability of maintenance 
9 추가적 소요장비 및 기술교육의 용이성(_____) 
9 Convenience of acquiring extra equipment & technical training 
 
이유(Why): 
 
Domestic Political Issues
8 National Security(국가안보) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 한반도 평화체제 유지(_____) 
9 Maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula  
9 전략적 대북정책 실현(_____) 
9 Realization of the strategic policy toward North Korea 
9 군사적 변화를 통한 전략적 군사력 형성(_____) 
9 developing the strategic military strength through Military transformation 
 
이유(Why): 
 
9 U.S.- ROK Alliance(한미동맹) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 한반도 비핵화 및 북한의 도발 저지(_____) 
9 Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula & Obstruct North Korean provocations 
9 한미공조체제 강화(_____) 
9 Intensification of the U.S.-ROK mutual assistance structure 
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9 전략적 동맹관계 형성(_____) 
9 Building up strategic alliance 
 
이유(Why): 
 
10 Northeast Asia Strategy(동북아전략) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 주변국과 군사적 세력평형 유지(_____) 
9 Maintenance of the military strength balance with bordering states 
9 동북아 다자안보협력의 제도화(_____) 
9 Systematization of Northeast Asian multi-national security cooperation  
9 한미동맹을 바탕으로 한 주변국과의 협력관계 유지(_____) 
9 Maintenance of cooperative relationships with bordering states based on U.S.-ROK 
Alliance 
 
이유(Why): 
 
11 Defense Budget Levels(국방비수준) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 사업규모의 적절성(_____) 
9 Pertinence of the business size 
9 장비수명을 고려한 예산편성(_____) 
9 Budgetary allocations considering lifecycle costs 
9 2012년 전시작전권 환수를 위한 자국방위의 노력(_____) 
9 Effort for the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012 
 
이유(Why): 
 
12 ROK Political Environments(정치환경) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 한미동맹의 인식(_____) 
9 Recognition of U.S.-ROK Alliance 
9 정부의 대북정책 방향(_____) 
9 Direction of the government policy toward North Korea 
9 평화통일을 위한 노력(_____) 
9 Effort to move toward peaceful unification 
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이유(Why): 
 
 
13 Trend of Public Opinion(여론) ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦
 
9 언론을 통한 여론의 긍정적 효과달성(_____) 
9 Achievement of positive public opinion through the press. 
9 투명성과 공정성의 반영(_____) 
9 Reflection of transparency & fairness 
9 국민의 공감대 형성(_____) 
9 Creation of a national consensus 
 
이유(Why): 
 
 
 
 
추가항목(Other Factors): 
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Appendix 2.  Abbreviation & Acronyms 
 
AECA:  Arms Export Control Act 
AEW&C:  Airborne Early Warning & Control 
AFIT:  Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFLC:  Air Force Logistics Command 
AFSAC:  Air Force Security Assistance Center 
ALC:  Air Logistics Center 
AMC:  Army Materiel Command 
ASD:  Assistant Secretary of Defense  
ASF:  Airborne Early Warning & Control Support Facility 
BO:  Blanket Order 
CAS:  Contract Administration Services 
CFC:  US-ROK Combined Forces Command 
CLSSA:  Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement 
CSP:  Concurrent Spare Part 
DAMR  Defense Acquisition Management Regulation 
DAPA:  Defense Acquisition Program Administration in South Korea 
DCAA:  Defense Contract Audit Agency 
DCMA:  Defense Contract Management Agency 
DCS:  Direct Commercial Sales 
DFARS:  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
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DFAS:  Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
DFAS-DE:  Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Denver Center 
DISAM:  Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 
DLA:  Defense Logistics Agency 
DoD:  Department of Defense 
DSAA:  Defense Security Assistance Agency 
DSAMS:  Defense Security Assistance Management System 
DSCA:  Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
EDA:  Excess Defense Article 
EEZ:  Exclusive Economic Zone 
FAA:  Foreign Assistance Act 
FAA:  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR:  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FFB:  Federal Financing Banks 
FLO:  Foreign Liaison Office 
FMF:  Foreign Military Financing 
FMFP:  Foreign Military Financing Program 
FMS:  Foreign Military Sale 
FMSA:  Foreign Military Sales Act 
GAO:  General Accounting Office 
GFE:  Government Furnished Equipment 
GFM:  Government Furnished Materiel 
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IA:  Implementing Agency 
ILS:  Integrated Logistics Support 
ILSPM  Integrated Logistics Support Process Manual 
IMET:  International Military Education and Training 
INSS:  Institute for National Strategic Studies 
ISA:  International Security Affairs 
ITAR:  International Trade in Arms Regulation 
JSF:  Joint Strike Fighter 
JUSMAG:  Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group 
KDX:  Korean Destroyer Experimental 
KHP:  Korean Helicopter Program 
KMA:  Korea Military Academy 
KOTRA:  Korea Trade-investment Promotion Agency 
LC:  Lifecycle Cost 
LOA:  Letter of offer and Acceptance 
LOO:  Letter of Offer 
LOR:  Letter of Request 
LSC:  Logistics Support Cost 
MAP:  Military Assistance Program 
MDE:  Major Defense Equipment 
MILSPEC:  Military Specification 
MND:  Ministry of National Defense 
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MROs:  Material Release Orders 
NLL:  Northern Limit Line 
NRC:  Non-Recurring Cost 
NSC:  National Security Council 
OA:  Obligational Authority 
OMB:  Office of Management and Budget 
OPCON:  Operational Control 
P&A Data:  Price & Availability Data 
P&A:  Price & Availability 
PATO:  Patent And Trademark Office 
PBL:  Performance-Based Logistics 
PC&H:  Packing, Crating & Handling 
R&D:  Research & Development 
RFP:  Request For Proposal 
RMA  Reliability, Maintainability and Availability 
ROC:  Required Operational Capability 
ROK:  Republic Of Korea 
SAAC:  Security Assistance Accounting Center 
SAMM:  Security Assistance Management Manual 
SCC:  Security Cooperation Committee 
SCM:  US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting 
SECDEF:  Secretary of Defense 
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T&E  Test and Evaluation 
USAF:  United States Air Force 
USG:  U.S. Government 
USML:  US Munitions List 
WMD:  Weapon of Mass Destruction 
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Appendix 3.  Definition of Terms 
 
1. Foreign Military Sales: FMS 
This is a system under which the U.S. government sells military supplies based on 
external payment means and/or foreign loans to the U.S. friendly nations, allies or 
international organizations in accordance with inter-government contracts. The sales are 
classified into defined order, blanket order, and military supplies support agreements. 
 
2. Foreign Military Sales Act 
In Oct, 1968, the U.S. Government established the Foreign Military Sales Act to separate 
military sales from the Foreign Assistance Act enacted in 1961. The U.S. thus established 
a single legislative system aimed at selling defense materials and services to its friendly 
nations and international organizations, including joint production and cooperative 
military support  
 
3. Price and Availability Data: P&A 
This refers to the data containing information on reliability equal to that of a requisition 
and Letter of Acceptance (LOA) in respect to the purchase under FMS credit system and 
detailed prices, and this information is provided by the Department of Defense, U.S.A. to 
the Purchase Bureau within 45 days from the date of request. 
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4. Technology Transfer 
An act of providing new technologies by the technology owner to other persons requiring 
such technologies, such as the transfer of industrial property rights, or the provision of the 
industrial property rights license or related technical data. 
 
5.  Interoperability 
Indicates the ability of 2 or more items or of equipment components capable of executing 
basically same functions or otherwise capable of supplementing with each other 
irrespective of the technical characteristic difference of a system, and almost without 
conducting additional training for the related personnel. 
 
6.  Life Cycle Cost: LCC 
Refers to overall cost required from the time an equipment is developed and acquired 
until the equipment is dismissed, which includes R&D cost, investment, operational and 
maintenance cost. 
 
7. Offset  
This is a conditional trade based on which the government, when acquiring military 
equipment, materials and services, requests foreign contractors for a specific 
consideration, such as the technology transfer and/or parts buy-back. This offset trade is 
classified into a direct offset trade dealing in the technology transfer and parts exports 
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related to the military supplies to be acquired, and an indirect offset trade not having 
direct relation with the military supplied to be acquired. 
 
8. Integrated Logistics Support: ILS 
This is an act of comprehensively managing, in order to ensure effective and economical 
logistics support, all logistics support elements (Maintenance programs, support and 
testing equipment, supply support, transportation, handling, packing, personnel and 
training, facilities, technical data, logistics support funds, logistics management 
information) covering the entire processes from the weapon system requirement planning 
stage to design, development, acquisition, operation and abandonment. 
 
9.  Budget 
This is the financial plan covering 1 fiscal year which is subject to approval by the 
National Assembly. The plan shows balanced expenditures and revenues divided into 
types and amounts by function and nature, and is divided into a regular budgets and 
special budgets 
 
10. Letter of Agreement: LOA 
This is a document jointly prepared by the using military service components, Agency for 
Defense Development and the principal contractors with respect to the weapon systems 
R&D projects covering operation concept, required data, performance, required time, 
 110 
technical approach, development schedule, support element for deployment, and cost 
analysis. This document forms the basis for the preparation of a system development plan. 
 
11.  Letter of Request: LOR 
These are standard forms used by the U.S. Department of Defense or its subordinate 
agencies to request for information or offers on materials to be purchased through FMS. 
 
12. Letter of Intent: LOI 
This is used as a payment guarantee prior to the issuance of a requisition and/or LOA for 
items which require long period of production or as a payment guarantee until the time 
the products are accepted after LOA is issued. 
 
13. Defense Acquisition Development Plan 
This is a document which contains acquisition policies and the weapon and major 
equipment acquisition plan (introduction from foreign countries; R&D) based on Military 
Strategy Plan and Joint Force Requirement Plan, and is used as a basis for the 
establishment of a medium range defense plan 
 
14. Direct Purchase from Foreign Countries 
One of foreign introduction methods, this refers to an act of purchasing the weapon 
systems developed and produced in foreign countries, in the form of end products. 
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15. Licensed Production: LP 
This is a form of technology introduced production under which specific products are 
manufactured without foreign country's technical support, after receiving or leasing the 
production rights from foreign countries. 
 
16.  Industry Self-Development 
Refers to an act of developing products using industry self-developed facilities and 
technological capability. All expenses related to the development project are defrayed by 
the developing industries, and the Government does not take any responsibility with 
respect to the compensation for development expenses in case of development failure; 
nor is the Government obligated to purchase the products after development. 
 
17. Defense Products 
Indicate the materials designated among those provided for military use (military supplies) 
in accordance with the provisions of Special Law governing defense industry. In 
principle, materials falling under this category are those classified as weapon systems. 
However, materials currently under development which are expected to be classified as 
weapon systems after the completion of development may be designated as defense 
products. 
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18. Acquisition 
Acquisition is a term used to denote integrated efforts made to develop, produce, and 
supply weapon systems for users (military service components requiring weapon 
systems). This involves activities starting from the concept creation stage to the time 
when the final products are delivered to users. Operating the supplied weapon systems by 
using units to carry out assigned missions is not included in these activities. 
 
19. Procurement 
This is an act of facilitating economic activities by acquiring, at the required time and 
place, appropriate type of materials, facilities or services required for the economic 
activities 
 
20. Government-to-Government Purchases 
This is one of the direct purchase methods under which Korean government buys 
products with external payment means or loans based on an agreement signed between 
Korea and foreign countries, and this includes FMS of the U.S.A. 
 
21. Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
Performance-based logistics is the acquisition of support as an integrated, affordable 
performance package designed to optimize product readiness and meet performance goals 
through long-term support arrangements with clear lines of authority and responsibility. 
PBL involves buying performance outcomes. 
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22. Maintainability 
The ability of an item to be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when 
maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed 
procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. 
 
23. Reliability 
The probability that a facility or service will perform its intended mission for the given 
mission time, expressed a percentage. 
 
24. Acquisition Logistics 
Technical and management activities conducted to ensure supportability is considered 
early and throughout the acquisition management process to minimize support costs and 
provide the user with the resources to sustain the product or service in the field 
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Appendix 4.  Result of the Research 
Table 1: Overall Outcome of the Research  
  
U.S.     Other Countries 
F‐X  E‐X  KDX‐II     WLR‐X  KDX‐II  KDX‐I 
                  average                   average  Total.Ave.
1. Interoperability  7  7  7  6 7 4 6.3  7 7 6 7 4  6  6.2   6.25 
   7  7  7  5 6 4 6.0  7 6 6 6 4  6  5.8   5.92 
   7  2  7  6 6 4 5.3  1 7 7 6 4  6  5.2   5.25 
   7  6  6  5 7 4 5.8  7 6 5 7 4  5  5.7   5.75 
2. Offset Valuation  7  7  3  6 6 6 5.8  7 6 5 6 4  5  5.5   5.67 
   4  7  2  4 7 6 5.0  6 5 3 7 4  6  5.2   5.08 
   5  6  2  3 5 5 4.3  3 4 3 6 3  6  4.2   4.25 
   7  7  6  6 6 5 6.2  7 5 3 7 3  5  5.0   5.58 
   5  1  3  6 6 6 4.5  7 4 6 5 4  5  5.2   4.83 
3. Mission performance capability  7  7  5  6 6 7 6.3  7 7 6 7 7  7  6.8   6.58 
   7  7  6  7 5 7 6.5  7 7 7 7 7  7  7.0   6.75 
   1  3  4  5 6 7 4.3  7 4 6 6 7  5  5.8   5.08 
   7  5  7  5 5 7 6.0  7 7 6 6 7  5  6.3   6.17 
4. Integrated Logistics Support  4  7  6  7 6 5 5.8  7 7 7 7 5  6  6.5   6.17 
   4  7  6  6 7 5 5.8  7 7 7 7 5  6  6.5   6.17 
   4  7  5  6 6 5 5.5  2 4 7 7 5  5  5.0   5.25 
   4  7  6  7 6 5 5.8  7 5 7 7 5  6  6.2   6.00 
   4  5  6  7 7 5 5.7  7 4 4 6 5  7  5.5   5.58 
5. Lifecycle  4  6  6  5 5 4 5.0  6 6 6 6 4  5  5.5   5.25 
   4  7  6  5 6 4 5.3  7 6 7 6 4  6  6.0   5.67 
   1  5  5  5 5 4 4.2  6 4 4 6 4  4  4.7   4.42 
   1  5  7  5 4 4 4.3  6 5 7 7 4  5  5.7   5.00 
6. Timely deployment  7  5  6  7 6 5 6.0  6 7 5 6 3  4  5.2   5.58 
   7  5  6  7 5 5 5.8  1 7 7 7 3  4  4.8   5.33 
   7  5  6  7 6 4 5.8  7 6 4 7 2  4  5.0   5.42 
   7  5  6  7 7 5 6.2  3 6 6 7 3  4  4.8   5.50 
7. Depot Maintenance  4  4  6  4 5 3 4.3  6 4 4 6 3  6  4.8   4.58 
   4  4  6  4 4 3 4.2  1 3 4 7 3  6  4.0   4.08 
   4  5  6  4 5 3 4.5  7 4 4 7 3  6  5.2   4.83 
   4  4  6  4 6 3 4.5  6 3 4 6 3  6  4.7   4.58 
8. National Security  5  5  2  4 3 3 3.7  4 7 4 4 3  4  4.3   4.00 
   5  5  2  3 3 3 3.5  4 7 4 5 3  4  4.5   4.00 
   5  5  2  5 4 3 4.0  4 6 4 5 3  3  4.2   4.08 
   5  7  2  4 3 3 4.0  4 6 7 5 3  5  5.0   4.50 
9. U.S.‐ROK Alliance  5  1  6  4 4 5 4.2  4 3 4 4 3  4  3.7   3.92 
   5  1  7  4 5 5 4.5  5 3 4 5 3  4  4.0   4.25 
   5  1  6  4 3 5 4.0  4 3 4 4 3  4  3.7   3.83 
   5  1  6  4 4 5 4.2  4 3 4 4 3  4  3.7   3.92 
10. Northeast Asia Strategy  5  5  2  3 3 4 3.7  4 3 4 4 3  3  3.5   3.58 
   5  5  2  2 3 5 3.7  4 3 6 5 3  3  4.0   3.83 
   5  5  2  2 3 3 3.3  4 3 3 5 3  3  3.5   3.42 
   5  5  2  4 3 3 3.7  4 3 3 4 3  3  3.3   3.50 
11. Defense Budget Levels  7  5  6  6 5 3 5.3  5 6 6 6 3  4  5.0   5.17 
   3  5  6  6 5 3 4.7  6 6 7 6 3  4  5.3   5.00 
   1  5  6  6 5 3 4.3  6 5 7 6 3  5  5.3   4.83 
   5  5  7  6 5 3 5.2  4 4 4 5 3  3  3.8   4.50 
12. ROK Political Environment  5  5  2  3 3 5 3.8  4 4 5 4 3  3  3.8   3.83 
   5  5  2  3 3 5 3.8  4 3 4 4 3  3  3.5   3.67 
   5  5  2  4 3 5 4.0  4 4 7 5 3  3  4.3   4.17 
   5  5  2  3 3 4 3.7  4 3 4 5 3  3  3.7   3.67 
13. Trend of Public Opinion  2  1  6  6 4 3 3.7  4 6 4 5 4  3  4.3   4.00 
   2  1  6  6 3 2 3.3  2 4 4 5 2  3  3.3   3.33 
   2  1  7  7 4 4 4.2  7 6 7 5 4  4  5.5   4.83 
   2  1  6  6 4 3 3.7  4 5 4 5 3  3  4.0   3.83 
Total  256  255  265  272 262 234 257.3  275 269 277 310 199  249  263.2   260.25 
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Table 2: Scatter Graph of Comparing Factors 
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Table 3: Factor Priority & Outcome of the Research 
  
U.S     Other Countries 
F‐X  E‐X  KDX‐II     WLR‐X  KDX‐II  KDX‐I 
Factor  Rank                   average                   average total average 
average 
sum 
1. Interoperability  2  1. Interoperability  7  7  7  6  7 4  6.3  7 7  6  7 4 6 6.2  6.25  12.5 
2. Offset Valuation  4  2. Offset Valuation  7  7  3  6  6 6  5.8  7 6  5  6 4 5 5.5  5.67  11.33 
3. Mission performance 
capability 
1  3. Performance Capability  7  7  5  6  6 7  6.3  7 7  6  7 7 7 6.8  6.58  13.17 
4. Integrated Logistics Support  3  4. Integrated Logistics Support  4  7  6  7  6 5  5.8  7 7  7  7 5 6 6.5  6.17  12.33 
5. Lifecycle  6  5. Lifecycle  4  6  6  5  5 4  5.0  6 6  6  6 4 5 5.5  5.25  10.5 
6. Timely deployment  5  6. Timely deployment  7  5  6  7  6 5  6.0  6 7  5  6 3 4 5.2  5.58  11.17 
7. Depot Maintenance  8  7. Depot Maintenance  4  4  6  4  5 3  4.3  6 4  4  6 3 6 4.8  4.58  9.167 
8. National Security  9  8. National Security  5  5  2  4  3 3  3.7  4 7  4  4 3 4 4.3  4.00  8 
9. U.S.‐ROK Alliance  11  9. U.S.‐ROK Alliance  5  1  6  4  4 5  4.2  4 3  4  4 3 4 3.7  3.92  7.833 
10. Northeast Asia Strategy  13  10. Northeast Asia Strategy  5  5  2  3  3 4  3.7  4 3  4  4 3 3 3.5  3.58  7.167 
11. Defense Budget Levels  7  11. Defense Budget Levels  7  5  6  6  5 3  5.3  5 6  6  6 3 4 5.0  5.17  10.33 
12. ROK Political 
Environment 
12  12. ROK Political Environment  5  5  2  3  3 5  3.8  4 4  5  4 3 3 3.8  3.83  7.667 
13. Trend of Public Opinion  9  13. Trend of Public Opinion  2  1  6  6  4 3  3.7  4 6  4  5 4 3 4.3  4.00  8 
   
total  69 65 63  67 63 57 64.0  71 73 66 72 49 60 65.2  64.58  129.2 
   
Average  5  5  5  5  5 4  4.92  5 6  5  6 4 5 5.01  4.97  9.936 
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